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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. 
Nature Of The Case 
This dispute regards critical issues of the Industrial Commission's failure to address the 
medically diagnosed condition of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and a failure to 
recognize the physical manifestations and physical injury involved, which entitle a claimant to an 
award of benefits, and specifically as required here, to award Appellant compensation benefits 
for the injury suffered during the course of her employment with Ada County. The nature of this 
injury is a "mental-physical" injury, classified and defied under $ 72-451 and $ 72-102, Idaho 
Code, wherein the Idaho Legislature specifically intended injuries of this nature to be 
compensable under the law. Appellant's injuries are workplace injuries, accompanied by the 
presence of physical manifestations and physical injuries, caused from the effects of the 
traumatic confrontational encounter she underwent, when the erroneous and false accusations, 
malicious threats of prosecution, threats of incarceration and extreme fear of the permanent loss 
of her law enforcement career was suddenly exploded upon her, causing a psychological 
workplace injury of extreme magnitude and resulting physical consequences. 
Appellant had dedicated her life to attain a law enforcement career, and made that 
commitment to Ada County, only then to be obliterated from that sudden and extraordinary 
encounter brought about from the confrontational and accusatory setting caused when Ada 
County detective agents unleashed this "accident", leaving physical and bodily injury, 
accompanied with physical manifestations, that has culminated in a permanent change of the 
functioning aspects of several components within Claimant's brain, forever causing identifiable 
physical changes and damage to the structure of the brain and its normal range of function. The 
resulting disorder has been determined by medical analysis (clinical and psychometric) to be 
predominately caused from this horrific trauma from this confrontational event, as diagnosed by 
Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend, M.D., an internationally recognized psychiatrist residing in Idaho, who 
classified Appellant's condition to be Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), with resulting and 
ongoing objectively confirmed and defined physical injuries and physical manifestations, with 
permanent physical injury and a permanent medical disability, and an entitlement for her 
impairment that does approximate 50% loss of normal function. 
11. 
Course Of Proceedings Below 
This matter was processed through the Idaho Industrial Commission, upon the hearing 
and post-hearing depositions, from which Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation was 
rendered by Referee Douglas A. Donohue, denying any right to benefits. The series of post- 
hearing depositions was taken to address aspects of the medical analysis from the experts 
presented by the parties. A preliminary decision and recommendation was rendered March 2, 
2007 (Ag. R., p. 1629-1653), and the Industrial Commission adopted and approved the proposed 
findings, conclusions, and recommendation on March 16,2007 (Ag. R., p. 1654-1655). On April 
5, 2007, Appellant sought reconsideration of the Commission's final order (Ag. R., p. 1661- 
1699), but such request was denied by the Commission (Ag. R., p. 1768-1769), from which an 
appeal was taken to the Tdaho Supreme Court from that final order and denial of any benefits to 
Claimant. 
The issues as presented to the Referee at hearing on September 12,2005, were as follows: 
1. Whether Claimant has complied with the notice and limitations requirements set 
forth in Idaho Code, $ 72-701 through Idaho Code § 72-706, and whether these 
limitations are tolled pursuant to Idaho Code $ 72-604. 
2. Whether the condition for which Claimant seeks benefits was caused by the alleged 
industrial accident. 
3. Whether Claimant suffered an injury caused by an accident arising out of and in the 
course of employment. 
4. Whether Claimant's condition is due in whole or in part to a subsequent intervening 
cause. 
5. Whether and to what extent Claimant is entitled to the following benefits: 
a) Temporary partial andlor temporary total disability benefits (TPDITTT)); 
b) Permanent partial impairment (PPI); 
c) Disability in excess of impairment; and 
d) Medical care. 
6. Whether apportionment for a pre-existing condition pursuant to Idaho Code $ 72- 
406 is appropriate. 
7. Whether Claimant's condition is compensable under Idaho Code 3 72-451. 
By virtue of the March 2, 2007 Decision (Ag. R. p. 1629-1653), the Commission Referee 
submitted his Findings and Conclusions, contained on pages 24-25 of the Decision, stating: 
1. Claimant failed to give timely notice of accident and injury as required by 
Idaho Code $ 72-701, and the m i n g  of the statute was not tolled by operation of 
Idaho Code $72-604; 
2. Claimant failed to show she suffered a compensable accident; 
3. Claimant failed to show she suffered an injury caused by an event arising 
&om or in the course of employment; 
4. Claimant failed to show she suffered a physical manifestation of a 
psychological injury as required by Idaho Code 72-45 l(1); 
5. Claimant's claim is barred by application of Idaho Code 3 72-45 l(2); 
6. Each of the foregoing conclusions of law independently precludes 
compensation under the Idaho Workers Compensation Law, and 
7. All other issues are moot. 
Those Findings and Conclusions were approved by the Commission and became part of the 
final order entered March 16,2007 (Ag. R., p. 1654-1655), fiom which this appeal was taken. 
111. 
Statement of Facts 
In early 1997, Ms. Gibson, Claimant and Appellant herein, committed her lifelong desire to 
a career with law enforcement. She became employed initially on July 10, 1997 as a Records 
Technician with the Ada County Sheriffs Office, located at the Boise State University (BSU) 
Substation (Cl. R., p. 536). Appellant was promoted and transferred to the main Jail Facility 
October 15, 1998, serving as a Jail Technician (Cl. Ex. 17, p. 3 & p. 33; Cl. Ex. 20, p. 3). At the 
time of this transfer, Appellant's gross wage was $1,500.00 a month (Cl. Ex.. 17, p. 3 & p. 33; C1. 
Ex. 20, p. 3), and the County Payroll Department was directly depositing wages into a joint 
checking account belonging to Appellant and her husband (Cl. Ex.. 17, p. 36). 
The Ada County Payroll Department, by virtue of their use of a flawed computerized 
payroll system, had created pay period errors in calculating each of Appeliant's monthly wage 
records, and consequently had miscalculated all payroll disbursements to her. In addition to the 
failure to properly calculate each of the Jail Technicians' overtime salaries, an event ongoing since 
1994 and confirmed to be known to the County, the Payroll Department failed to calculate correctly 
Appellant's salary for the regular monthly wage due Claimant ($1,575.00) as required from the 
promotion. Payroll had incorrectly calculated wages by adding together an old wage pay scale of 
$1,500.00, with an incorrect wage scale of $1,550.00, creating a gross miscalculation and resulting 
enoneous deposit of $3,050.00 to the direct deposit account (Cl. Ex. 17, p. 4, 14-18; C1. Ex. 20, p. 
3), instead of a single pay scale monthly wage of $1,575.00. As a component of her regular wage 
scale, there would also be added to it some amount for her accrued overtime wage for the month, 
though that had always proved to be uncertain and unpredictable, and always was being 
miscalculated for the historic reasons referenced herein. Payroll performed this ''regular" wage 
error for eight (8) months, unknown to Payroll personnel, unknown to Appellant or her husband, 
and unknown to the Sheriffs Finance-Budget Director. 
The direct deposit process received no accounting analysis from anyone. Appellant had 
no involvement with the check register, and neither Appellant or her husband opened bank 
statements on a regular basis, and found no need to balance the account status on any occasion, 
as they were never notified of an overdraft in its occasional use. The absence of oversight for 
account reconciliation from Appellant's household stemmed from the fact associated with 
Appellant's husband's work schedule, as he was on commission sales, selling farm equipment 
out of state, gone 75% of each month, used cash from ATM withdrawals, and he alone would 
deposit funds if an overdraft would occur from his withdrawals, which did not occur during the 8 
month period regarding the erroneous deposits of Claimant's regular wage. Whatever Mr. 
Gibson drew against the account by way of ATM procedure for cash expenditures on out-of-state 
sales' campaigns, he always deposited that much or more, as he made deposits of his 
commissions and reimbursed the account for travel expenditures when paid. He was never 
informed what sums Ada County had automatically deposited into their account. The account 
would only get a reconciliation when individual tax returns were prepared, but on this occasion, 
Appellant and her husband had before requested C. Grant King, Attorney At Law, to file a 
Voluntary Reorganization under Chapter 13 in Federal District Court, Boise, Idaho, under In Re 
Gibson, Case No. 99-01258-TLM, Federal District Court, District of Idaho, because of certain 
tax disputes Mr. Gibson had ongoing before his marriage to Appellant. Mr. King did file that 
Petition on May 17, 1999, and Schedule I of that Petition did show the 1999 wage expectation 
for use in the Plan from Ms. Gibson's contribution to the marriage to be the monthly sum of 
$1,550.00 (Ag.R. p. 1711-1745; C1. EX. 17, p. B-26). 
The County's erroneous calculations and deposits constituted a series of violations of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). That included 8 21I(c), regarding wage record-keeping 
errors, as the County was utilizing a flawed computer system, and it included a violation of 5 
207(k), &om the ongoing underpayment of accrued overtime wages, actually being a known 
misuse of the "7k" exemption used by Ada County since 1994, as it was knowingly causing 
accounting errors on all Jail Technician employees for overtime wages. See Knickerbocker, et 
al. v. Ada Couny, Idaho, Case No. CV 04-288-S-BLW, U.S. District Court, District of Idaho 
(2007). This Court may take Judicial Notice of the County Affidavits submitted and Decision as 
was rendered in that matter. These record-keeping practices used to generate regular wages 
(affecting Ej 211(c)), together with the ongoing underpayment of overtime wages (affecting Ej 
207(k)), constituted miscalculations, and resulted in the consequence of a net overpayment 
directly deposited to this account, that had no regular oversight by either the receipt@) or from 
the source of deposit. 
To add to the confusion, from January 1, 1999 through June 30, 1999, Appellant had 
worked extensively beyond her scheduled regular work shifts, accruing 281 hours of overtime 
wages, none of which was calculated correctly or properly paid even to this day, as required by 
FLSA. 
On July 19, 1999, the Sheriffs Office Finance-Budget Director, solely by coincidence and 
unrelated to this ongoing series of errors, discovered other errors occuning in the County's 
accounting process for unpaid "overtime" wages due Sheriffs Office employees, and Payroll then 
determined overtime wages were due to nine (9) County employees (Cl. Ex. 21; Ag. R. p. 424-430), 
and Appellant was identified as one of those underpaid employees, because of the confusion on the 
combination of the mixed wage issue, where two pay scales were being mingled. It was only from 
that beginning reconciliation Payroll was then able to discover the errors of overpayment generated 
and processed for deposit. Reacting in a rather unprecedented manner, and undoubtedly regretful 
behavior in hindsight, when the Sheriff heard of the errors, he assumed criminal activity was in 
process because of the way he perceived it had taken place (assumed a conspiracy), and the Sheriff 
ordered two (2) detectives to conduct an internal criminal investigation (CI. Ex. 17; CI. Ex. 20; C1. 
Ex. 18; CI. Ex. 19; and focus was then placed directly and solely upon Appellant. The error was 
identified later to approximate $8,000.00-$8,500.00 in excess net deposits. 
On July 20, 1999, while Appellant was recovering at home because of outpatient back 
surgery @ef. Ex. 12), and on medical leave from her shift assignments, she received a call from the 
detectives, requesting she get dressed and come to the Sheriffs Office (Cl. Ex. 17, p. 4). 
For two and one-half (2 %) hours these detectives interrogated Appellant over the 
accounting error (CI. Ex. 18 & 19), and threatened her during their intrusive investigative 
techniques, with such accusations she was a thief (Cl. Ex. 19, p-38.42), a liar (Cl. Ex. 18, p. 9-10; 
17-20; 26-27; 33; 48; C1. Ex. 19, p. 33-34; 36), and had collaborated with members of Payroll to 
cause overpayments deposited into the account (Cl. Ex. 18, p. 37); threatened her with criminal 
prosecution for grand theft (Cl. Ex. 19, p. 10-11; Cl. Ex. 15), threatened her with incarceration 
(Cl. Ex. 19, p. 1 l), loss of her job (Cl. Ex. 19, p. 37-38, and destruction of her law enforcement 
career. Appellant was traumatized by the event, devastated by the accusations, and perceived 
these traumatic threats as now destroying her career, her job, her future, and her very life, 
resulting in substantial fear from the insanity of these unfounded claims, and now feared for her 
very safety and security, as County officials were choosing to use her potential right to control 
the depository status of the account as the essence of some claimed criminal behavior. Appellant 
was placed on immediate leave (Cl. Ex. 19, p. 43; C1. Ex. 20, p. 4), though had done nothing 
wrong under the responsibilities of her employment. Appellant was kightened to the brink of an 
emotional meltdown and saw herself being "framed" because of the County's irresponsibility 
and reckless errors, and being told about and seeing what happens to banished law enforcement 
personnel accused of crimes, she felt abandoned and completely helpless from these outrageous 
contentions and lingering criminal accusations. 
The detectives knew Appellant had no involvement in causing wage payments (Cl. Ex. 
19, p. 6; C1. Ex. 21), long or short, and had no control over funds directly deposited by computer 
into an account; that all aspects of payroll record-keeping was entirely controlled by the County, 
as their responsibility, and these detectives were acting under Sheriff orders to engage their 
interrogation techniques. 
Because of the leave status imposed, Appellant's husband secured an attorney to 
represent his wife, and on July 28, 1999, Vernon K. Smith, her counsel, received a call from R. 
Monte MacConnell, Sheriff's Legal Advisor, stating the Sheriff wanted Ms. Gibson terminated, 
and if she refused to resign from the Sheriff's Office, she would be processed with felony 
grand theft, and would then be fired immediately (Cl. Ex. 3). A cascade of events then 
followed. 
Appellant absolutely refused to resign the hard-earned dedication to a law enforcement 
career, and because of her stubbornness, she came officially under surveillance by law 
enforcement officers, stalked by Sheriff detective(s) or officers, whose acts were documented in 
discovered file records, confuming what she knew had occurred on December 16" and 1 7 ~ ,  
1999 (C1. Ex. 19, p. 7-8), as that surveillance was overtly conducted, believed to be orchestrated 
to intensely frighten Appellant into seeing her need to resign to avoid being constantly 
shadowed, as to that point she had refused to resign and refused to accept fault for the County's 
administrative errors, and persisted in demanding a reconciliation of wages required under FLSA 
and exercised her right to retain her career. 
The initial leave status was converted to "leave without pay", clearly in violation of the 
County's own Merit System, contrary to Federal law, and in disregard of her expressed agreement 
to cooperate fully with a reconciliation process and accept pay reduction identified in the County 
Ordinance Gxhibit H of C1. Ex. 63), upon reconciliation of the deposits (Cl. Ex. 8, p. 10-1 1). As 
she persisted, she was met with threats and fear, and fmally f ~ e d  December 27, 1999, as a further 
traumatic blow to her future and her career. 
At all times prior to July 20, 1999, Appellant enjoyed superb employee status, regarded an 
exemplary employee, received exceptional and excellent performance ratings, and deemed an 
excellent asset to Ada County and its Sheriffs Office (Cl. Ex. 27). 
From this traumatic encounter in July, 1999, Appellant %st was examined by a physician on 
July 23, 1999, and placed under the care of Dr. Stephen E. Spencer, M.D., for what he described to 
be "acute depression secondary to situational distress", and "acute depression and anxiety 
accompanied by physical manifestations of elevated blood pressure, migraine headaches, severe 
rash, sleeplessness, diarrhea, lack of appetite and hair loss, as a result of the July 20, 1999 encounter 
(Cl. Ex. 39; C1. Ex. 38; C1. Ex. 37; Cl. Ex. 36; C1. Ex. 35; Def. Ex. 11). As the analysis progressed, 
it was confmed Appellant was diagnosed to have suffered a psychological workplace injury, by 
diagnoses undertaken by Dr. Joseph A. Lipetzky, Psy.D., who confmed Panic Disorder With 
Agoraphobia (Cl. Ex. 58). She was clinically diagnosed by Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend, M.D. to be a 
well-documented case of neurological brain hc t ion  change and physical injury to the brain fiom 
this disorder, defined medically as a Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) (Cl. Ex 42 & 56; Ag. 
R., p. 893). Her condition continued to degrade from the encounter through the resulting 
dysfunction associated from this disruptive brain function and impairment to that of normal brain 
behavior, as the situation continued to replicate the reintroduction of the trauma, flaring up from the 
Sheriffs demands for confrontational "informal hearings" (Cl. Ex. 8, August 25, 1999 letter) and 
the overt awareness intended from the surveillance episodes, and this process of unintended 
revictimization served to intensify the physical injury and ongoing physical manifestations caused 
from the changes to the hippocampus and locus caeruleus regions within the brain, impacted from 
intense trauma of this nature. Dr. Heyrend became her primary treating physician and psychiatrist 
in 2002, developing treatment through psychotherapy and medication. He saw it critical to engage 
an outpatient psychiatric treatment program, and she received outpatient medical care from Dr. 
Keyrend continuously from October, 2002 (Cl. Ex. 42), until he retired in the Fall, 2007, including 
needed psychotherapy and such medication as required to address this brain function disorder, as he 
attempted to sooth the degree of resulting damages. 
Since the initial diagnosis of PTSD, Dr. Heyrend continued to observe her physical 
condition and manifestations through ongoing therapy and treatment, and uniquely saw her again 
become revictimized by certain specific events and documents brought about by the repeated 
examinations pursued by Ada County's ongoing analysis and counter efforts to defeat a claim for 
benefits, and he saw the subsequent empirical effects from these examinations, validating his 
clinical diagnosis. His observations during treatment demonstrated the condition she suffered, 
and exhibited the full characteristic and nature of the very signature of the disorder as diagnosed 
by him, and those demonstrable characteristics had confmed her physical injury to the brain 
and the objective assessment of physical manifestations from the impaired physical components 
in the brain, as described by Dr. Heyrend, causing the brain's dysfunctional activity. The 
process of revictimization produced the unquestioned empirical and objective evidence of the 
very disorder in question, and its physical properties identified the physical injuries to the brain's 
function, demonstrated by her reactions to each of these external experiences she endured. 
Dr. Heyrend well-expressed his medical opinion in his medical reports (Cl. Ex. 42,46, 51, 
52, 53), letters to Claimant's counsel (Ag. R., p. 859 & 893-904), Affidavits (Ag. R., p. 948-968), 
and post-hearing depositions, including that of November 17, 2005, confming the PTSD he 
diagnosed to be objectively identified to an absolute medical certainty, and confirmed her physical 
brain injury, which he found to be initially severe in nature, became presently considered by him 
from the benefit of treatment to still have such a physical brain damaging consequence to be at or 
approximate a 50% impaired state (C1. Ex. 42; November 17, 2005 Deposition of Dr. Heyrend, 
page 44, l i e  17- page 45, l i e  24). Her condition was medically evident, as it was evidenced by the 
empirical fact of her reactions when revictimized from the intrusive examinations forthcoming from 
the initial orders for examination of June 19, 2003 and April 12, 2005, which caused effects of 
physical manifestations from the examination that produced the clinical consequences (Ag. R., p. 
859 & 893-904). This f ~ s t  occurred when confronted by Dr. Cynthia Brownsmith, the psychologist 
selected by the Employer-Surety, who sought Ms. Brownsmith to "evaluate" Appellant's condition. 
Appellant was instructed to comply with these orders (Ag. R., p. 150-151; 865-866; 944-945;977- 
978;1067-1068; 1122-1 123; 1188-1 189; 1192, entered by the Industrial Commission, and the result 
was to exhibit the severe reactions in that process, as a consequence. Dr. Brownsmith conducted 
four evaluations, June 20, 2003, June 24, 2003, July 11, 2003, and again April 14, 2005. These 
encounters caused Claimant to relive the trauma on each occasion, and her documented reaction 
was characteristic of PTSD brain damage, due to psychological consequences because of the 
physical injuries in the brain, that caused the encounter to trigger the trauma over and over again. 
This was occurring because she had endured a degree of permanent brain disorder, revealed as 
described by the testimony of Dr. Heyrend in his November 17, 2005 Deposition. See November 
17,2005 Deposition of Dr. Heyrend, page 50, line 13-page 53, line 19; page 42, line 19-page 46, 
line 2; page 46, line 3-page 5 1, line 1 1. 
The revictimization by Dr. Cynthia Brownsmith from the April 14,2005 session was video- 
taped and preserved for fhture reference in analysis (Cl. Ex. 61). Dr. Heyrend did review that 
session in detail (Ag. R., p. 948-968), by virtue of that preservation, and concluded Dr. Brownsmith 
had triggered the characteristic of this established disorder, and was unable to find even the 
threshold needed to relieve and manage the stress she had created &om that intrusion, serving to 
demonstrate it was that severe. The examination, from a clinical posture, could be seen as hitful, 
as it demonstrated the reactionary consequence of the disorder; however, it was horribly destructive, 
as it served to leave a "hurricane of trauma" built up like a steaming volcano, and it can be released 
and soothed only by therapy and medication. Dr. Heyrend had to stabilize Appellant from each of 
the re-lived experiences, requiring his use of an "alpha-2 blocking agent" medication to address the 
PTSD anxiety reaction. That particular medication, Guanabenz (Cl. Ex. 41, 42, 75, 77, 79, 81 & 
83), is a powerful drug (alpha-2 blocking agent), and serves to intervene the functions of the brain, 
as the physical injury is caused to the locus caeruleus of the brain, and the medication works to calm 
the area of damage from the physical injury caused to that portion of the brain. It is effectively used 
to reduce anxiety, and structure a pathway for psychotherapy used to modulate the injury (Cl. Ex. 
41,42 & November 17,2005 Deposition of Dr. Heyrend, page 46, line 5-15). 
Dr. Heyrend saw it was a beneficial oppoxtunity to attempt to educate the State Insurance 
Fund, as they acted as though they did not want to recognize PTSD as a compensable claim. Dr. 
Heyrend wanted to demonstrate the objective nature of this physical damage and injury to the brain, 
as he believed he could enable the State Insurance Fund to understand the supportive analysis of an 
electroencephalogram evoked-potential @EG) brain map diagnostic testing of Ms. Gibson's brain, 
and he then chose to conduct that procedure on March 3 1,2005 (Ag. R., p. 948-968). He felt it was 
necessary, as Ada County and the State Insurance Fund were contending the claim lacked a physical 
injury, and should be viewed only as a "mental-mental" injury, rather than a "mental-physical" 
workplace injury (Ag. R., p. 948-968). The data collected from Ms. Gibson's EEG (C1. Ex. 47) was 
then provided to State Insurance Fund in this further venue format as made available in this stimuli- 
response, reaction technique, to show true brain function disorder and correlated activity. It served 
to demonstrate, through this venue, a clear objective observation of brain function, along with 
objective consequences of stimulated episodes of revictimiiation, and that clinical analysis 
presented by Dr. Heyrend demonstrated his PTSD clinically diagnosed condition, which he 
continued to confm as well from his ongoing analysis during efforts spent at treatment and 
therapy. Ms. Gibson has a variety of confirming characteristics (including physical manifestations 
such as headaches, stomachaches, dizziness, blurred vision, fatigue and excessive sweating and 
chills) of what has been described to be the well-known conditions of PTSD brain damage patients, 
all of which Dr. Heyrend concluded had objectively confmed what he found, and what he 
diagnosed in October 16,2002, when announcing his medical opinion on the injury of Ms. Gibson 
(Cl. Ex. 42). Dr. Heyrend had declared, by a medical certainty, not just medical probability, that 
Claimant had suffered a "mental-physical" injury (Cl. Ex. 42; November 17 Deposition of Dr. 
Heyrend, page 41, line 5-15), recognized as a clinically diagnosed Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 
properly compensable under Idaho Workers' Compensation Law. 
Ms. Gibson had been specifically diagnosed as a personality type in a unique group of 
humans that falls into a subset base of people who more easily downgrade into a dysfunctional state 
in these situations caused fkom a traumatic disaster, and they more easily develop these neurosis of 
panic and stress disorders that identify conditions that are clinically diagnosed as Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder and traumatic neurological brain function disorders fkom the physical change within 
the hippocampus and locus caeruleus that impairs brain function. Ms. Gibson is of a personality 
trait that responds more sharply to verbal assaults, is of a character that is more intensely engaged, 
and has a decreased pain tolerance by her emotional structure, and is clearly within that subset and 
characteristic of human beings that develop this clinically recognized Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (Cl. Ex. 42; November 17,2005 Deposition of Dr. Heyrend, page 41, line 16- page 44, line 
16). 
Continuing with his medical treatment and therapy, Dr. Heyrend submitted an evaluation 
on June 23,2005, containing a written report and stated in detail: 
CLINICAL IMPRESSIONIMENTAL CONDITION: 
"As a result of my October 16, 2002 evaluation, I determined Ms. Gibson exhibited 
symptoms of short-term memory loss, panic attacks, anxiety, hyperreactivity, depression, 
feelings of loss of self-esteem, and intrusive recollection. 
I initially diagnosed Ms. Gibson to be suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD), classified as constituting a "mental-physical" injury, and caused as a result of 
the catastrophic, intrusive and threatening course of conduct utilized by detectives 
(co-employees if you will), who were ordered to interrogate Ms. Gibson on July 20, 
1999. This condition has not and will not resolve fblly. On March 31,2005, I conducted 
an EEG on Ms. Gibson to demonstrate an objective means of conducting my ongoing 
findings that support that clinical diagnosis of PTSD, and to determine the ongoing 
extent of her mental and physical injuries. Findings of that assessment are that Ms. 
Gibson has lived with the following since the events of July 20, 1999: 
Intrusive memories of the interrogations on a daily basis 
Sleep disturbances where she awakens from nightmares in a panic state 
Emotionally distant, withdrawn and isolated from others 
Loss of interest in social and other activities 
Hypervigilance and startled reactions as a daily activity 
Avoidance of activities that arouse memories or trauma, such as anything to do 
with Ada County and the Ada County Sheriffs Office 
She gets angry and agitated with mixed episodes of depression 
Difficulty with authority figures, and a hard time dealing with others 
An occasional fugue state, accompanied by short-term memory loss and anxiety 
Headaches, stomachaches, dizziness, blurred vision, fatigue and excessive 
sweating and chills 
Panic attacks, flashbacks, feelings of helplessness, paranoia, insecurity and lack of 
confidence 
Ms. Gibson has been traumatized and does experience progressively worsening anger, 
irritability, difficulty sleeping, and sometimes unprovoked rage frightening to her and to 
those around her, especially those in her family that have experienced the change. 
During the first thirteen (13) months following the events of July 20, 1999, Ms. Gibson 
remained severely traumatized from the experience she suffered and endured, and due to 
that condition, she remained unemployed until the month of August 2000. During that 
period, my opinion is Ms. Gibson suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, to the 
extent of being Severe. Since then, taking into consideration her medical history, 
symptoms, interview behavior, EEG and then having stabilized to the degree to be able to 
maintain some degree of employment, it would indicate she now suffers from Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder in the Moderate Range. 
Axis I 309.81 Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Moderate 
Axis 11296.3 Major Depressive Disorder 
Axis I11 None 
Axis IV Occupational and Social Impairments with deficiencies in many 
areas 
Axis V Global Assessment Functioning 55 (current). In the last year 55 to 
65." 
(Emphasis added). See C1. Ex. 42 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. 
WHETHER APPELLANT'S PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKPLACE INJURY, RESULTING 
IN PHYSICAL MANIFESTATIONS AND PHYSICAL BRAIN INJURY, IS A 
COMPENSABLE INJURY AS DEFINED BY 5 72-102(18)(A) THROUGH (C), AND 
PROVIDED FOR UNDER 5 72-451, IDAHO CODE. 
WHETHER FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
RECOMMENDATION OF THIS REFEREE, TOGETHER WITH THE "FINAL" ORDER 
OF THE COMMISSION, AM) THEUi ORDER DENYING CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION, WERE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS ORDERS ENTERED 
CONTRARY TO LAW. 
WHETHER THE REFEREE'S ORDER TO STRIKE EXHIBIT 2 OF DR. F. LAMARR 
HEYREND'S NOVEMBER 17, 2006 DEPOSITION FROM THE RECORD WAS AN 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION, ARBITRARY AND CONTRARY TO LAW. 
WHETHER THE CONSTRUCTION, VALIDITY AND COMMISSION'S FORCIBLE 
APPLICATION OF IDAHO'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, § 72-433, 5 72-434, 
AND 9 72-435, IDAHO CODE, IS A DIRECT VIOLATION OF THE STATUTE AND 
APPELLANT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND EQUAL 
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE 1 4 ~  AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 
AS IT CAUSED CLAIMANT TO BE "REVICTIMIZED". 
WHETHER APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS, AS A 
MATTER OF RIGHT AND LAW, FOR ALL PROCEEDINGS BELOW, AM) ON 
APPEAL. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing a decision from the Industrial Commission, this Appellate Court 
exercises free review over questions of law, and reviews questions of fact as needed to determine 
whether substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission's findings. See Pierce v. 
School District #21, 144 Idaho 537, 164 P.3d 817 (2007); Stolle v. Bennett, 144 Idaho 44, 156 
P.3d 545 (2007); Spencer v. Allpress Logging, Inc., 134 Idaho 856, 859, I I P.3d 475,478 (2000) 
(citing Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 910 P.2d 759, 760 (1996)). Whether the law was 
correctly applied to the facts by the Commission is an issue of law over which appellate courts 
exercise fkee review. Konvalinka v. Bonneville County, 140 Idaho 477, 478, 95 P.3d 628, 629 
(2004) (citing Combes v. State, Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 130 Idaho 430, 942 P.2d 554 
Findings of fact will not be disturbed if supported by substantial and competent 
evidence in the record to support a Commission's findings. See Excell Const., Inc. v. State, 141 
Idaho 688, 692, 116 P.3d 18 (2005); Jensen v. City of Pocatello, 135 Idaho 406, 412, 18 P.3d 
2 1 1 (2000); Zapata v. J: R. Simplot Co., 132 Idaho 513, 515, 975 P.2d 1 178, 1 180 (1 999); and 
Taylor v. Soran Restaurant, Inc,  131 Idaho 525, 527,960 P.2d 1254 (1998). See also Hutton v. 
Manpower, Inc., 143 Idaho 573, 149 P.3d 848 (2006); Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 
342, 344, 109 P.3d 1084, 1086 (2005); Bollinger v. Coast To Coast Total Hmakare, 134 Idaho 
1,4,995 P.2d 346 (2000); and Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87,88,910 P.2d 759 (1996). 
In a Workers' Compensation claim, a claimant carries the burden of proof to a reasonable 
degree of medical probability the injury for which benefits are claimed is causally related to an 
accident occurring in the course of employment ..... The causation must be proved by expert 
medical testimony. See Jensen v. City of Pocatello, supra. See also Curtis v. M H. King Co., 
142 Idaho 383,387, 128 P.3d 920 (2006; Bowman v. Twin Falls Const. Co., 99 Idaho 312,317, 
581 P.2d 770, 775 (1978); and Hart v. Kaman Beaving & Supply, 130 Idaho 296,299,939 P.2d 
Any findings, conclusions, or decisions of an agency which are found to: (a) violate 
constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) be made 
upon unlawhl procedure; (d) not be supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole; 
(e) be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion; or (f) be the result of a prejudicial 
infringement of a substantial right of an individual, are in violation of Idaho law and cannot 
be sustained. See Chisholm v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 142 Idaho 159, 162, 125 P.3d 
515 (2005); Cooper v. Bd. of Id State Bd. of Med., 134 Idaho 449,454,4 P.3d 561, 566 (2000); 
see also 8 67-5279(3), Idaho Code. 
Any erroneous findings and conclusions on the issue of "credibility", and the weight of 
evidence, which have been rendered upon arbitrary or capricious acts, abuse of discretion, 
unlawful procedure, or in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision, are inconsistent 
with Idaho law, and subject to review on appeal, and any agency decision based upon 
erroneous findings and conclusions on credibility, and weight of evidence, will not be 
sustained when the basis is clearly erroneous. 
ARGUMENT PRESENTED ON ISSUES ON APPEAL 
WHETHER APPELLANT'S PSYCHOLOGICAL W O W L A C E  INJURY, RESULTING 
IN PHYSICAL MANIFESTATIONS AND PHYSICAL BRAIN INSORY, IS A 
COMPENSABLE INJURY AS DEFINED BY 9 72-102(18)(A) THROUGH (C), AND 
PROVIDED FOR UNDER 5 72-451, IDAHO CODE. 
The Legislative history dealing with what constitutes compensable claims in Workers' 
Compensation matters is an issue in this case. With the addition of 5 72-45 1, Idaho Code, to Idaho 
Workers' Compensation Law in 1994, the Legislature's Statement of Purpose (RS 03232Cl) 
provided the following guidance: 
"The purpose of the legislation is to clearly state that Idaho Workers' 
Compensation Laws will not recognize what is commonly referred to as the 
"mentaUmental" claim. However. claims for what are commonlv called < 
"physicaUmental" and "mentaUphysicaP' will be recognized, assuming certain 
conditions are met. The "mentaVphysical" claims must be of sudden and 
extraordinary onset. All psychol~gi~al c aims, because of their subjectivity, 
must meet certain elements to be recognized". (Emphasis added). 
5 72-451, Idaho Code, thereupon allowed a claimant to be compensated for psychological 
injuries, disorders, and conditions as follows: 
1) Such injuries of any kind or nature emanating from the workplace shall be 
compensated only if caused by accident and physical injury as defined in 
section 72-102(18)(a) through (18)(c), Idaho Code, or only if accompanying an 
occupational disease with resultant physical injury, except that a psychological 
mishap or event may constitute an accident where: (i) it results in resultant 
physical injury so long as the psychological mishap or event meets the other 
criteria of this section, and (ii) it is readiiy recognized and identifiable as having 
occurred in the workplace, and (iii) it must be the product of a sudden and 
extraordinary event; and 
(2) No compensation shall be paid for such injuries arising &om conditions 
generally inherent in every working situation or from a personnel related action 
including, but not limited to, disciplinary action, changes in duty, job evaluation 
or employment termination; and 
(3) Such accident and injury must be the predominant cause as compared to 
all other causes combined of any consequence for which benefits are claimed 
under this section; and 
(4) Where psychological causes or injuries are recognized by this section, such 
causes or injuries must exist in a real and objective sense; and 
(5) Any permanent impairment or permanent disability for psychological injury 
recognizable under the Idaho workers' compensation law must be based on a 
condition sufficient to constitute a diagnosis using the terminology and criteria of 
the American psychiatric association's diagnostic and statistics manual of mental 
disorders, third edition revised, or any successor manual promulgated by the 
American psychiatric association, and must be made by a psychologist, or 
psychiatrist duly licensed to practice in the jurisdiction in which treatment is 
rendered; and 
(6) Clear and convincing evidence that the psychological injuries arose out of and 
in the course of the employment from an accident or occupational disease as 
contemplated in this section is required. 
Nothing herein shall be construed as allowing compensation for psychological 
injuries from psychological causes without accompanying physical injury. 
(Emphasis added). 
The terms injury and accident as used in (i 72-451, Idaho Code, are defined in (i 72- 
102(18), to be as follows: 
9 72-102(18)(a), Idaho Code, defines injury as: 
"a personal injury caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of any 
employment covered by the workers' compensation law". 
$72-102(18)(b), Idaho Code, defmes accident as: 
"an "unexpected, undersigned, and unlooked for mishap, or untoward event, 
connected with the industry in which it occurs, and which can be reasonably 
located with the industry in which it occurs, and which can be reasonably located 
as to time when and place where it occurred, causing an injury. 
§ 72-102(18)(c), Idaho Code, states: 
"injury and personal injury shall be construed to include only an injury caused 
by an accident, which results in violence to the physical structure of the body. 
(Emphasis added). 
Pursuant to Idaho law, the employment needs to be a contributing factor to the 
psychological and physical injuries forming the basis of the claim. See Kiger v. Idaho Corp., 85 
Idaho 424, 430, 380 P.2d 208, 210 (1963), quoting Eriksen v. Nez Perce Counly, 72 Idaho 1,235 
P.2d 736 (1951); accord Cornish v. Simplot Fertilizer Co., 86 Idaho 79, 86, 383 P.2d 333, 338 
(1963). Idaho case authority has established that a "claimant's employment need not be the only 
cause of disability, but rather that the job must have contributed to the disability". See 
O'Loughlin v. Circle A. Const., 112 Idaho 1048, 1051,739 P.2d 347 (1987). 
An analysis of this Claimant's psychological workplace injury begins with a review of 
the relevant statutory language. In Luttrell v. Clearwater Co. Sheriffs Oflce, 140 Idaho 581, 
584, 97 P.3d 448 (2004), the Court held psychological injury claims under § 72-451, Idaho 
Code, are compensable when they meet the following conditions: 
a. The injury was caused by an accident and physical injury or 
occupational disease or psychological mishap accompanied by resultant 
physical injury; 
b. The injury did not arise from conditions generally inherent in every 
working situation or from a personnel related action; 
c. Such accident and injury must be the predominant cause as compared 
to all other causes combined of any consequence; 
d. The causes or injuries must exist in a real and objective sense; and, 
e. The condition must be one which constitutes a diagnosis under the 
American Psychiatric Association's most recent diagnostic and 
statistics manual, and must be diagnosed by a psychologist or 
psychiatrist licensed in the jurisdiction in which treatment is rendered. 
By June 23, 2005, and with the benefit of continuing medical diagnosis, therapy and 
observations of ongoing encounters resulting in predictable reactions, Dr. Heyrend submitted his 
evaluation to a medical certainty, and stated Ms. Gibson was suffering from Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD), classified as constituting a "mentadphysical" injury, and caused as a 
result of the catastrophic, intrusive and threatening course of conduct utilized by detectives 
ordered to interrogate Ms. Gibson on July 20, 1999" (C1. Ex. 42; November 17,2005 Deposition 
of Dr. Heyrend, page 41, line 5-15. 
The Evaluation Report of Dr. Joseph Lipetiky on April 29, 2004(C1. Ex. 58), described 
the interrogation conducted on July 20, 1999 by Sergeant Scott Johnson, to be the traumatic 
cause of Appellant's injuries, and stated, "Detective Johnson did a good job of placing Stacy 
Gibson squarely in Criteria A for Agoraphobia. Anxiety about being in situations from which 
escape might be difficult (a felony conviction for embezzlement) or in which help may not be 
available in the event of having an unexpected or situationally predisposed Panic Attack or 
panic like symptoms. @SM-IV-TR, P.433)" (Cl. Ex. 58, page 13-15. 
Ms. Gibson's Workers' Compensation claim has been determined by a physician- 
psychiatrist and a psychologist to have been predominately caused from the sudden, traumatic 
and frightful event that occurred on July 20, 1999, within the facility where she worked at the 
Ada County Sheriffs' Office. That specific, extraordinary, unanticipated and untoward 
workplace event was the predominant cause of Claimant's resulting physical injuries and 
physical manifestations that culminated in diagnosis of these clinically recognized injuries of 
Panic Disorder and PTSD disorder. Dr. Heyrend's diagnosis confirmed Appellant suffered Post- 
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and since it was predominately caused by the sudden and 
extraordinary events of July 20, 1999, such an injury is intended to be a compensable injury, 
regarded to be a psychological workplace injury as defined by 5 72-451 and 5 72-102(18), Idaho 
Code. 
Medical diagnosis and opinions of physicians who treat a claimant must be given equal 
or greater weight to other opinions of physicians (or psychologists) who only see a claimant in 
preparation for trial, and designed only to challenge the right of benefits in the context of their 
assignment as a "hired gun". See McGee v. Lumber, 135 Idaho 328,334, 17 P.3d 272 (2000) and 
Graves v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 87 Idaho 451,456,394 P.2d 290,293 (1964). 
Medical testimony presented for a claimant needs only support a claim to a reasonable 
degree of medical probability. Langley v. State, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 
781, 785, 890 P.2d 732, 736 (1995). "Probable" has been defined as the state of the record 
"having more evidence for than against." Fisher v. Bunker Hill Co., 96 Idaho 341,344,528 P.2d 
903, 906 (1974). Magical words are not necessary to show a doctor's opinion was held to 
provide a reasonable degree of medical probability; the only requirement is the existence of plain 
and unequivocal testimonial evidence conveying a conviction that events are causally related to 
the injury. Jensen v. City of Pocatello, 135 Idaho 406, 412-13, 18 P.3d 21 1, 217-18 (2001). A 
physician's testimony is not required in every case, and medical records may be utilized to 
provide such source of "medical testimony." Jones v. Emmett Manor, 134 Idaho 160, 164, 997 
P.2d 621, 625 (2000). See also Burton v. Beck Cabinet Company, Znc., Findings Of Fact, 
Conclusions, And Order, IC 02-522585 and IC 03-505022, Filed May 11,2006. 
In this claim, Dr. Heyrend has presented medical records, testimony in both pre- and post- 
hearing depositions, developing objective data to support the claim of PTSD to a degree of medical 
certainty, not just to a degree of medical probability. Furthermore, there has been no intervening 
cause; rather there has been confming intervening events that have excited the physical 
manifestations by the ongoing process of revictimization, which serves to identify the full 
symptomology of the severe physical injury to the normal functionality of the brain, being the 
classic effect of PTSD, and what took place in this traumatic event. 
When determining impairment, the opinions are advisory, and the Commission must decide 
the benefits a claimant is entitled to receive for any impairment. See Urry v. Walker & Fox 
Masonry Contmcctors, 115 Idaho 750,755,769 P.2d 1122,1127 (1989). But the decision cannot be 
contrary to law, or arbitrary or capricious. 
The Workers' Compensation Law is to be liberally construed in favor of an employee. 
See Reese v. V-1 Oil Company, 141 Idaho 630, 115 P.3d 721 (2005); Haldiman v. American Fine 
Foods, 117 Idaho 955,956,793 P.2d 187, 188 (1990); Sprague v. Caldwell Transportation, Inc., 
116 Idaho 720, 721,779 P.2d 395, 396 (1989). The humane purposes which it serves leaves no 
room for narrow, technical construction. See Reese v. V-I Oil Company, supra; Ogden v. 
Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 910 P.2d 759, 760 (1966). See also Burton v. Beck Cabinet 
Company, Inc., Findings Of Fact, Conclusions, And Order, IC 02-522585 and IC 03-505022, 
Filed May 11,2006. 
Idaho's Workers' Compensation Law does provide for the exclusive remedy for injuries 
arising out of and in the course of employment. See Yeend v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 104 
Idaho 333, 659 P.2d 87 (1982); Provo v. Bunker Hill Co., 393 F. Supp. 778 (D.1daho 1979); 
Tucker v. Union Oil Co. of Calg, 100 Idaho 590,603 P.2d 156 (1979); Adam v. Titan Equipment 
Supply Corp., 93 Idaho 644, 470 P.2d 409 (1970); Nichols v. Godpq,  90 Idaho 345, 41 1 P.2d 
When the Idaho Legislature created the Industrial Commission, it did intend for all 
proceedings to be as "summary, economical, and simple as the rules of equity would allow"'. 
See Hite v. Kulhenak Bldg. Contractor, 96 Idaho 70, 72, 524 P.2d 53 1, 533 (1974) and Stolle v. 
Bennett, 144 Idaho 44, 156 P.3d 545 (2007). See also 5 72-708, Idaho Code. Review of the 
Commission proceedings must be addressed with that intention in mind, as Commission 
proceedings are designed to be informal and for simplicity; the primary purpose being the 
attainment of justice in each individual case. Hagler v. Micron Technology, Inc., 118 Idaho 
596, 599, 798 P.2d 55, 58 (1990). Industrial Commission proceedings are intended to be simple, 
accommodating, and must seek justice. Id. "[Tlhe Commission has historically been imbued 
with certain powers that specifically enable it to simplify proceedings and enhance the likelihood 
of equitable and just results." Id. 
Respondents suggest the "sudden and extraordinary event" language contained in 5 72- 
451(1), Idaho Code, is defined to mean instantaneous, brief or immediate in nature. The word 
"sudden", however, should be defined to mean "happening without previous notice or with very 
brief notice; coming or occurring unexpectedly; unforeseen; unprepared for." See Black's 
Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, page 1,600. The word "extraordinary" is defined to 
mean "out of the ordinary; exceeding the usual, average, or normal measure or degree; beyond 
or out of the common order or rule; not usual, regular, or of a customary kind." See Black's 
Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, page 699. 
Where an employer, through its assigned agents, undertakes to conduct the unannounced 
and sudden events of accusatory criminal investigation, creating a severely heightened trauma 
and £tightened results in a particular worker that triggers a reaction of fear and trauma, 
reasonably perceived by a person as destructive betrayal, deception and threatening to her safety, 
life, future, employment and hard-earned career, we have a situation extraordinary, beyond the 
common order or rule, and unlikely to recur. See Brown & Root Constr. Co. v. Duckworth, 475 
So.2d 813 (Miss. 1985). 
Appellant was unexpectedly confronted by Detective Glenn and Sergeant Johnson, who 
gmesomely interrogated her (Cl. Ex. 17, 18, 19 & 20) over the County's wage errors, and 
threatened her by using intrusive criminal techniques, calling her a thief (Cl. Ex. 19, p. 38-42), a 
liar (Cl. Ex. 18, p. 9-10; 17-20; 26-27; 33; 48; C1. Ex. 19, p. 33-34; 36), claimed she collaborated 
with others to cause these overpayments (C1. Ex. 18, p. 37); threatened her with criminal 
prosecution (CI. Ex. 19, p. 10-1 1; 16), claiming she committed a felony (Cl. Ex. 19, p. 37), said 
she would be incarcerated (Cl. Ex. 19, p. l I), would loose her job (Cl. Ex. 19, p. 37-38), and 
suffer the destruction of her career. She was devastated by all of that false pretense and 
accusations, felt helpless, feared for her personal safety and her career, felt her future and her 
very life destroyed, caused £tom County errors, and now expressed in threats by these trained 
interrogationists who pummeled unjust threats towards her. She had done none of what they 
accused her of doing, and perceived herself as being "framed" and to be used as this scapegoat 
for the County's ongoing record-keeping errors, despite the fact the County had an ongoing 
accounting problem since 1994. See Knickerbocker, et al. v. Ada County, Idaho, Case No. CV 
04-288-S-BLW, U.S. District Court, District of Idaho (2007). 
Pursuant to 5 7.05, Ada County Sheriffs Office Policy Manual (Exhibit C of Cl. Ex. 
63), Ms. Gibson had specific protection afforded to her should she become the subject of any 
internal investigation. Subparagraph 7 of 5 7.05, specifically states, "No member will be 
subjected to punitive action because of the exercise of privileges granted under this order or 
the exercise of any rights under the U.S. Constitution, Idaho Constitution, or applicable 
law". 
Detective Glenn initiated his intense conversation with Appellant on July 20, 1999 (Cl. 
Ex. 17 & 18), followed with Sergeant Johnson until approximately 5:30 p.m. (Cl. Ex. 19 & 
20), and all actions during that period took place at Claimant's workplace in a room at the Ada 
County Sheriffs Office, located at 7200 Barrister Drive, Boise, Idaho 83704. The event was 
extraordinary and sudden, and endured with threats and accusations for 2 '/z hours. The 
event happened without Ms. Gibson having prior knowledge the event was going to occur (Cl. 
Ex. 18), nor provided notice of any subject matter to be discussed, or idea the situation was 
about to occur. Appellant's exposure to the event was outside any recognizable or identifiable 
condition of her workplace, and well-beyond the common order or rule of her normal and 
expected working conditions. 
These officers have never admitted it was their intent to injure Claimant. "The words 
'out o f '  have been held to refer to the origin and cause of the accident, and the words 'in the 
course o f '  refer to the time, place, and the circumstances under which the accident occurred". 
See Dinius v. Loving Care and More, Inc., 133 Idaho 572, 574, 990 P.2d 738, 740 (1999). "If 
there is doubt surrounding whether the accident in question arose out of and in the course 
of employment, the matter will be resolved in favor of the employee". Id. (Emphasis added). 
It is simply not an event inherent in the workplace situation, nor found within the 
specification of her employment contract. It would not be normal when the event is diagnosed to 
have caused traumatic and physical brain function changes and physical injury and resulting 
physical manifestations, diagnosed as a PTSD and Panic Disorder condition, with documented 
irreversible and permanent physical brain injury. 
5 72-45 1(2), Idaho Code, states: 
"No compensation shall be paid for such injuries arising fkom conditions 
generally inherent in every working situation or from a personnel related action, 
including, but not limited to, disciplinary action, changes in duty, job evaluation 
or employment termination" 
The course of events orchestrated by Detective Glenn and Sergeant Johnson were not 
actions undertaken as authorized discipline, or to engage any change in duty status, or impose any 
form of punishment or discipline, as that was not their assignment. They were not there to deliver a 
job evaluation, and were not authorized to impose any form of personnel related action of any k i d .  
As Sergeant Johnson specifically states in his Sheriffs Case Log No. 1A 99-008, at page 4 (Cl. Ex. 
20), "Deputy Butch Glenn was assigned to investigate the case in regards to criminal charges". 
Because Claimant refused to resign when demand was made upon her counsel on July 28, 1999, 
Detective Glenn forwarded his Case Status Report (Cl. Ex. 17) to the Ada County Prosecutor's 
Office on August 3, 1999, seeking prosecution for grand theft, and on August 9, 1999, the Ada 
County Prosecutor, Greg Bower, sought to have Ms. Gibson prosecuted for grand theft through the 
assistance of a Chief Criminal Deputy Prosecutor in Canyon County (Cl. Ex. 16). 
After July 20, 1999, Ms. Gibson was never allowed to return to her workplace in the 
Sheriff's Office (Cl. Ex. 19, page 43). The County escalated her initial administrative leave 
(suspension), to administrative leave, without pay, on August 25, 1999 (Cl. Ex. 8, p. 8), and then 
elected to terminate her classified employment after ongoing surveillance activity, on December 27, 
1999, as Claimant persisted in her refusal to resign. The acts of Ada County and its agents, &om 
July 20, 1999 through December 27, 1999, were not good faith efforts of Ada County, but rather 
repeated acts in violation of Appellant's classified employment status under her employment 
contract, were in violation of the Sheriffs Policy Manual, and violated Claimant's constitutional 
rights, as no remedy existed through any available forum under State Statute or County Ordinance 
for review, as the provision(s) were held to be infirm. See Gibson v. Ada County Sherzrs 
Department, 139 Idaho 5,72 P.3d 845 (2003). 
In OZoughlin v. Circle A. Const., supra, the Court reversed a Comission's decision to 
deny benefits, holding a claimant's employment need not be the only cause of disability, just a 
contributing cause. 
When an individual sustains PTSD, supported by medical diagnosis and testimony to a 
medical certainty, the nature and extent of the damage is physical brain injuries by definition, 
and the physical manifestations ffom the July 20, 1999 traumatic encounter have become self- 
evident and the evidence and diagnosis is sufficient. Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend, M.D., as a 
"licensed physician" defined under 5 54-1803(3), is eminently qualified to make the PTSD 
diagnosis he has made of Claimant, and he made the medical findings of physical injury to the 
brain, to a degree beyond that of medical probability, as he objectively documented the integral 
and inseparable component of PTSD by his EEG analysis, undertaken to address that "extra 
mile" assurance in his attempt to educate the State Insurance Fund. Individuals, who suffer 
PTSD, by definition, suffer and exhibit physical manifestations, as well as an element of physical 
injury to the brain, and medical science has brought that medical fact to the courts, such that the 
case authority has now declared that to be part of the recognized science to a degree of reliable 
medical science. 
A mental impact or stimulus which caused the result of a distinct physical injury, is 
considered a "mental-physical" injury, and is compensable. See Chapter 56.02(1), 3 Arthur 
Larson, et al., Larson's Workers' Compensation Law. The Digest to Chapter 56 (56.02D), 3 
Arthur Larson, et al., Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, is a list of case authorities 
compiled to illustrate what are considered "mental-physical" injuries, and under what conditions 
those injuries are found to be compensable under the various state workers' compensation laws. 
In Daniel Construction Company v. Tolley, 24 Va. App. 70, 75, 480 S.E.2d 145 (1997), 
claimant's treating physician, Dr. Michael Hoffinan, described the physical injury to claimant's 
brain as follows: 
"[Claimant] suffered a traumatic experience that directly resulted in a 
neurochemical imbalance in his central nervous system. These are changes that 
occur at a cellular level and are entirely beyond the patient's control. It is shown 
throughout the medical literature that post-traumatic responses often 
manifest themselves in neurochemical changes in the brain. Recent evidence 
from the National Institute of Mental Health shows speeific structural 
changes within the neurons that is permanent and irreversible. Damage is 
done to neurosynaptic receptors and serotinergic neurotransmitters which are 
extremely difficult to treat.. ." Emphasis added. 
Relying on Dr. Hoffman's reports, the commission found claimant "suffered fiom both a brain 
injury that manifested itself through a psychiatric condition and an actual physical injury to the 
brain". Id. 75. 
In Ligeti v. British Airways, No. 00-CIV. 2936, U.S. District Court, S.D. New York 
(2001) (citing Turturro v. Continental Airlines, 128 F.Supp.2d 170, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), the 
court stated: 
"New technology has allowed doctors to perceive that extreme stress, ..... can 
actually change brain cell structure and cause a specific area of the brain to 
atrophy."); see also Turturro, 128 F. Supp.2d at 179 ("According to Floyd, 
bodily injury encompasses 'a change in the structure of an organ,' . . . . and the 
brain's physical architecture can transform during PTSD. Although the 
American Psychiatric Association still classifies PTSD as a mental disorder, that 
classification is not dispositive, and we acknowledge that under some 
circumstances a diagnosis of chronic PTSD may fall within the Convention's 
definition of 'bodily injury". (Emphasis added). 
In Trinh v. Allstate Insurance Cornpav, 109 Wn. App. 927, 37 P.3d 1259 (2002), the 
Washington Court held PTSD, since it is accompanied with physical manifestations, fell within 
the definition of "bodily injury, and is compensable. The State of Washington follows this 
majority view that "bodily injury" is not ambiguous in the context of emotional injuries 
accompanied with physical manifestations. The ordinary meaning "bodily injury" connotes a 
"physical problem", such as those experienced by Trinh, when her PTSD condition resulted in 
physical symptoms of headaches, nausea, sleep disorders, and hair loss, constituting physical 
manifestations of her disorder. The Trinh Court stated: 
"...many courts have held that allegations of physically-manifested emotional 
distress fall within "bodily injury" coverage in the insurance context. [fn19] A 
law review article observes that "[elven courts that have concluded that 
nonphysical harm does not constitute bodily injury have held otherwise when the 
emotional distress produces discernible physical symptoms."~fn20] And, many 
jurisdictions that deny "bodily injury" coverage for purely emotional injuries have 
indicated that there would be coverage if an emotional injury were accompanied 
by physical manifestations. [fn21jM 
In Pekin Insurance Co. v. Hugh, SOIN.W.2d 813 (Iowa 1990), "the court stated: 
[alny attempt to distinguish between "physical" and "psychological" 
injuries just clouds the issue. This is because the medical community now 
knows that "every emotional disturbance has a physical aspect and every 
physical disturbance has an emotional aspect." 
In Trinh, the Court found it helpful to review Federal Court decisions, and looked to 
those courts in the initial analysis to see how they interpreted the Warsaw Convention, in light of 
Eastern Airlines, In. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991), which consistently concluded an accident 
victim's PTSD condition constitutes a "physical injury because it results in discernible physical 
changes to the structure of the brain." 
These recent cases of Daniel Construction Company v. Tolley, supra, Ligeti v. British 
Aiavays, supra, Trinh v. Allstate Insurance Co., supra, and Turturro v. Continenla1 Airlines, 
supra, has verified individuals who suffer extreme stress from a traumatic experience, who are 
then diagnosed with PTSD, did suffer physical damage and specific structural injury to the body 
and brain, accompanied by resulting physical manifestations as a physical injury, and at times, 
determined to be permanent and irreversible. They identified the injury as bodily injury and as 
physical injury. 
In light of the established precedence in Federal Courts, Trinh v. Allstate Insurance 
Cornpaw, supra, concluded the tenn "bodily injury" includes emotional injuries "accompanied 
by physical manifestations." The Trinh court held that physically-manifested PTSD 
unambiguously and clearly falls within the broad term of bodily injury and physical injury. 
In Weaver v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 56 F.Supp.2d 1190 (Mont.1999), the court stated: 
"Weaver experienced terror and felt physical manifestations of that terror. 
(Id.) Subsequently, Weaver sought medical treatment for emotional and 
physical problems attributable to her flight experiences, and she was 
diagnosed with, and received treatment for, post-traumatic stress disorder." 
"Weaver asserts that she suffered physical injury and physical manifestations of 
injury." 
"Weaver explains that, in recent years, medical science has determined that 
extreme stress causes actual physical brain damage, i.e., physical destruction 
or atrophy of portions of the hippocampus of the brain. Weaver attaches 
several articles from scientific journals and expert reports in support. Weaver 
asserts that her diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder arose from the 
physical changes in her brain brought on during the extreme stress of the 
emergency landing." 
"Weaver has presented evidence of physical injury. (See, e.g., Aff of Dr. 
Bigler [Doc. No. 191, Ex. 2 at 4 (stating that "Kathy Weaver has a classic case of 
chronic posttraumatic stress disorder, PTSD has a physical basis [and] this 
physical basis is secondary to alteration in brain chemistry, physiology, and 
anatomy."); Aff. Of Dr. Yelvington [Doc. No. 201 at 2 (stating that the "impact on 
Kathy Weaver of the events which occurred on that flight was extreme and 
included biochemical reactions which had physical impacts upon her brain 
and neurologic system.") Weaver has met her burden of showing an absence of 
any factual basis that the emergency landing physically impacted Weaver's 
brain." 
"her claim is presented as a physical injury and she relies on recent scientific 
research explaining that post-traumatic stress disorder evidences actual trauma 
to the brain cell structures. Weaver's post-traumatic stress disorder 
evidences an injury to her brain, and the only reasonable conclusion is that it 
is, a bodily injury." (Emphasis added). 
PTSD constitutes a physical manifestation of bodily iuiurv or personal physical 
iniurv because "PTSD is a biological as well as an emotional and ps~chological illness." See 
In re Air Crash at Little Rock, Ark., on June I ,  1999, 118 F.Supp.2d 916, 924-25 (E.D. Ark. 
Contrary to Respondents' contention Dr. Heyrend never "tested" or "measured" Appellant's 
brain to determine what portions of her brain "shrunk", or to what extent shrinkage occurred, suffice 
it to say, that in 1997, two years before this traumatic encounter occurred and even in the year of the 
encounter, 1999, there was extensive medical literature and medical science abounding that was 
available to Respondents from the case authority, as well as the National Institute of Mental Health 
that did provide conclusive medical science and proof that Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
manifests permanent and irreversible neurochemical changes in the brain through specific structural 
changes and physical damage to neurosynaptic receptors and serotinergic neurotransmitters in the 
brain. See especially Daniel Construction Company v. Tollq (1 997), supra and Weaver v. Delta 
Airlines, Inc. (1999), supra. 
Dr. Lipetzky stated in his Evaluation and Report, page 16 (Cl. Ex. 58), Ms. Gibson met 
the criteria for Panic disorder "with" Agoraphobia (300.21) following her interrogation by 
detectives Glenn and Johnson, and "Ms. Gibson met the criteria for Panic disorder "without" 
agoraphobia (300.01) until the summer of 2002 based on Dr. Brownsmith's psychological 
evaluation." He also reported there was present the accompanying physical manifestations fiom 
his observations and evaluations that included insomnia, weight gain, migraine headaches and 
nightmares (Cl. Ex. 58). 
According to current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4" Ed. 
(soon to be expanded), American Psychiatric Association (DSM-IV), there exists five criteria for 
PTSD; (1) the stressor or traumatic event; (2) re-experiencing, or re-victimizing symptoms, 
flashbacks, ruminations about the trauma, and/or nightmares; (3) avoidance behavior; (4) 
depression or numbing of general responsiveness and arousal (anxiety); and (5) clinically 
significant distress or impairment in significant areas of life @ef. Ex. 37). When these 
psychiatric elements are present, an individual suffers unconditionally fiom PTSD. The physical 
injury sustained to a claimant's brain is a consequence of the presence of those criteria. 
Other physical injuries that could occur as a result of such traumatic settings may include 
heart attack, brain aneurysm, cerebral hemorrhage, stroke, and other seizure related 
consequences, potentially fatal, and they too are accompanied by physical manifestations or 
debilitating physical injury resulting fiom traumatic events. See Digest to Chapter 56 (56.02D), 
3 Arthur Larson, et al., Larson's Workers' Compensation Law. 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder is a unique injury, and concentrates on physical changes 
in the brain that affect brain structure or architecture. It is defmed medically and embraced 
legally, and is being classified as a "mental-physical" injury, and has physical components to the 
psychological event to include the brain injury and the occurrence of physical manifestations, 
and those factors have been diagnosed and determined in Claimant's situation by Dr. Heyrend, 
who has confirmed not just a medical probability, but to a medical certainty, that Appellant is 
suffering the injury, and has found an impairment disability rating as identified in his report(s). 
Whether a psychologist report, such as fiom Dr. Brownsmith, meets the definition of a 
"licensed physician" as defmed under fi 54-1803(3), Idaho Code, is a question of law, and 
whether a psychologist is qualified to undertake to diagnose and provide testimony as to the 
presence or absence of PTSD and "physical injuries" caused to a brain of PTSD victims is likely 
to be of less degree than the qualified physician and psychiatrist, Dr. Heyrend, and acting as 
Claimant's treating physician. The placement for psychologist licensing is intended to relate to 
psychological diagnosis defined under fi 54-2302(f), Idaho Code, and not that relating to 
physical injuries of the brain. 
fi 72-432(1), Idaho Code, requires an employer provide an injured employee "such 
reasonable medical, .. . attendance or treatment, ... medicines, . .. , as may be reasonably 
required by the employee's physician (Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend, M.D. and Dr. Stephen E. 
Spencer, M.D.) or needed immediately after an injury or manifestation of an occupational 
disease, and for a reasonable time thereafter." There is no difference between failing to provide 
medical treatment that is "reasonably required by the employee's physician or needed 
immediately after an injury" from failing to provide treatment "for a reasonable time thereafter." 
In Burch v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 82 Idaho 323, 327, 353 P.2d 1076, 1078 (1960), the word 
"treatment" was a broad term employed to indicate all steps taken to effect a cure of an injury or 
disease. See Reese v. V-1 Oil Company, 141 Idaho 630, 115 P.3d 721 (205). Once an employer 
has wrongfully failed to provide medical treatment, "the injured employee may do so at  the 
expense of the employer.!' See Reese v. V-I oil  Company, supra. Dr. Heyredhas confirmed 
Claimant needs therapy and medicinal management from her traumatic encounter, resulting 
PTSD and physical injuries. She continued with his therapy'until he retired in 2007. 
Appellant and the physician(s) are entitled to compensation under the Workers' 
Compensation Law for all medical expenses incurred for treatment and for all benefits and 
entitlements as a result of this injury caused by this accidental encounter "arising out of and in the 
course of her employment". See Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., supra; Dinius v. Loving Care and 
More, Inc., 133 Idaho 572, 574, 990 P.2d 738, 740 (1999); Seamans v. Maaco Auto Painting, 128 
Idaho 747,918 P.2d 1192 (1996). 
Ada County is held to accept its employee with their health conditions as they are; 
preexisting infmities do not preclude or eliminate the employee's right to seek workers' 
compensation, providing the injury was caused by, or at least aggravated or accelerated by the 
event. See Page v. McCain, supra, at 347; Wynn v. JR Simplot, 105 Idaho 102,104,666 P.2d 629, 
631 (1983). If injuries combine such that preexisting conditions are also there to cause or prolong 
disability, impairment or need for treatment, the condition is compensable when the injury is a 
major factor contributing to the cause of the resulting disability. See § 72-406, Idaho Code; see also 
Everingim v. GoodSmaritan Center, 1996 SD 104,552 N.W.2d 837. 
§ 72-406(1), Idaho Code, provides: 
'In cases of permanent disability less than total, if the degree or duration of 
disability resulting from an industrial injury or occupational disease is increased 
or prolonged because of a preexisting physical impairment, the employer shall be 
liable only for the additional disability from the industrial injury or occupational 
disease". Emphasis added. 
Apportionment of benefits would not be appropriate under 8 72-406, Idaho Code, as the statute 
requires an apportionment or deduction of a claimant's benefits only for the existence of a 
preexisting vhvsical impairment. Appellant did not have any of these physical manifestations or 
physical damage to her brain before July 20, 1999. The statute does not require a preexisting 
disability, whether it be physical or psychological. See Henderson v. McCain Foods, Inc., 142 
Idaho 559,130 P.3d 1097 (2006). 
Respondents have attempted to utilize the services of paid medical advocates to minimize 
the nature of Ms. Gibson's physical brain damage, and to build a defense with the use of a non- 
treating psychologist and a non-treating neurologist to suggest they are not aware of or have not 
found a physical injury, in an effort to stifle benefits. This strategy merely serves to invite 
reversible error, as the consequence of PTSD is de facto and equivalent to "brain injury", and that is 
physical injury as medically and legally defhed. To challenge the expert medical opinion of Dr. F. 
LaMarr Heyrend, M.D., who had unconditionally confirmed Ms. Gibson's PTSD condition, it 
cannot take away the confirmed diagnosis of PTSD and Dr. Lipetzky's diagnosis of Panic Disorder, 
both having physical manifestations and fmdings that confirm to a medical certainty, going well- 
beyond the burden of "medical probability" only. 
In their attempts to challenge these findings, on August 27,2003, Dr. Cynthia Brownsmith, 
the psychologist advocate, submitted her evaluation (Cl. Ex. 62), and after review of that report, 
Appellant's counsel sent Dr. Brownsmith a lengthy letter on October 29, 2003, challenging the 
assessment upon which it was based, and objecting to the baseless opinions in her report, as it was 
seen to be false and misleading (CI. Ex. 63). Dr. Brownsmith was invited to respond, and it was 
anticipated she would correct her report so as to properly reflect facts and address the medical 
science and issues involved, but no response was received, and no corrections were made. 
Of interest, and to emphasize the overreaching involved, even before Ms. Gibson's 
appointment, Dr. Brownsmith circulated a purported "cuniculum vitae" to include this case 
determination. (Cl. Ex. 59, p. 9). It fictitiously claimed Dr. Brownsmith had "forensic psychology 
experience" with Ms. Gibson. That was a fawcpas of major magnitude, as Dr. Brownsmith did not 
even speak to Ms. Gibson until June 20, 2003. Based upon that pretense, Appellant's counsel 
addressed her misstatement in an October 29, 2003 letter to Dr. Brownsmith, and the only 
consequence was a new circulation, eliminating the false claim, and stating the "forensic 
psychology experience" would be an upcoming event involving a Workers' compensation claim 
(Cl. Ex. 60). 
Of grave concern, and we trust will be recognized by this Court, is the insincere attitude of 
Respondents, to use a strategy to ignore medical science and to develop a strategy to combat the 
true physical injury medical science has confmed PTSD patients unconditionally do suffer, and 
such a strategy could only be undertaken for the purpose to insulate Ada County kom liability ftom 
its rather poor choice of conduct that creates extreme psychological trauma ftom such trauma 
inflicting encounters. There is no credibility in a "forensic evaluation" that ignores science, and is 
based on deception and falsehoods, and undertaken at an expense to the State Insurance Fund to 
obtain a non-qualified analysis as contained in a psychology report to defeat a valid claim. This 
flawed effort to impugn Ms. Gibson, both as to her character, her brain function injuries and 
physical manifestations, is grievous misconduct by an advocate, being a psychologist who may not 
even be allowed to give an opinion on physical injuries as she may not be one qualified to render 
diagnosis on the injuries to the brain, but nonetheless advancing a false evaluation and misplaced 
opinions to discredit the professionally documented condition from this disorder by a highly 
experienced figure on the subject of PTSD and other organic disorders in this medical community. 
The effects of her evaluation with the encounter, however, did serve to confirm the PTSD condition, 
as it degraded Appellant's brain functioning to a state of rumination, and caused a serious 
consequence of revictimization, having thereby demonstrated the very consequence that occurs in 
PTSD injury victims, something they apparently failed to understand, does occur when doing what 
they did. 
To complicate this approach, and to further demonstrate their lack of understanding of the 
medical science, Appellant was forced again to be revictimized by Dr. Brownsmith on April 14, 
2005, when Ms. Gibson, against the specific and declared medical concerns and advice of Dr. 
Heyrend, was required to endure more contact with Respondents' paid advocate (Cl. Ex. 42,43 & 
44; see especially C1. Ex. 61). The VHS video recording of this examination confmed the 
uncontrollable reaction forthcoming from this intrusive conduct by Dr. Brownsmith. Ms. Gibson 
ruminated significantly in the confrontation. Appellant was forced by the Commission Order to 
attend that "re-evaluation" on April 14, 2005 (Ag. R., p. 865-866), and Dr. Heyrend, as the treating 
psychiatrist, went on record to express his medical opinion any entry of such an Order, compelling 
Ms. Gibson to be again confronted and "evaluated", would serve only to again revictimize her, as it 
cannot be discounted the fact that would be the most probable result from her injuries, and it would 
cause another relapse and derailment of his efforts and accomplishments made toward the goal of 
reducing the effects of her brain damage (Ag. R., p. 948-968). 
After that evaluation, Dr. Heyrend was required to undergo medical intervention once again 
and stabilize Ms. Gibson fiom visiting that traumatic episode, and again requiring greater use of 
medications to balance the physical injury caused to the deep structures of Ms. Gibson's brain 
(locus caeruleus), to temporarily reduce her anxiety, and structure a pathway for more 
psychotherapy sessions. It was now becoming a further medical concern to Dr. Heyrend, if this 
revictimization should be allowed to happen over and over again, defeating his efforts at her 
recovery with use of psychoanalysis and medicinal treatment of her injury, he would need to 
consider action to address their conduct. On May 10,2005, in an effort to avoid his need to go to 
the State Board of Medicine for assistance, Dr. Heyrend presented his Affidavit and stated it was his 
medical opinion any further advocacy by more intrusive examinations would only serve to 
revictimize Ms. Gibson, and it had the clear potential to cause permanent harm to her mental, 
emotional and physical health (Ag. R., p. 948-968). This unorthodox and intrusive intervention, 
however, was allowed to happen one more time. 
Dr. Heyrend's perception, fiom his medical awareness and scientifically assured research, 
was precisely correct, as Appellant's reactions proved to be absolutely consistent with her PTSD 
symptomology, and each of Dr. Heyrend's concerns were born out and well-founded by the 
consequence of Respondents' efforts, and it served to demonstrate the extensive awareness he had, 
based upon his extensive study and practice of PTSD injuries. The Commission demonstrated a 
complete lack of understanding or ability to deal with the realities of the PTSD disorder, and we 
respectfully presume, out of a complete Iack of understanding, did then order Ms. Gibson to see yet 
another medical advocate hired by Respondents, which served to produce another revictimization 
from that advocate, Dr. Richard Wilson, M.D., and to add further insult to this ongoing relentless 
injury, even before he even saw her, he submitted a "Health Insurance Claim Form", requesting 
payment of $1,266.00, and also chose to opine, "patient's condition is not related to 
employment" C1. Ex. 66). This reflects even better advocacy at its frnest moment, as it was done 
before Dr. Wilson ever spoke to, saw or met Appellant. How could it get much more obvious? To 
add further insult to ongoing physical injury, Dr. Wilson then provided an Affidavit on May 11, 
2005, and stated, there "may be evidence of a neurological problem, namely that Mrs. Gibson may 
have complex partial epilepsy", an event that had no probable medical history (Cl. R, p. 983). 
There is no medical diagnosis to support even a medical probability that Claimant has or had 
"complex partial epilepsy". Appellant has no family history of epilepsy, no medical diagnosis or 
symptoms to assume that, yet that is the statement generated from this paid advocacy. 
The PTSD and Panic Disorder conditions have' a specifically identifiable physical 
manifestations and physical disability components associated with it, caused from the damage 
resulting to the brain's functionality, and that dysfunction has been especially described by Dr. F. 
LaMarr Heyrend in his November 17, 2005 Deposition, identified in his medical records, 
demonshated very well in his extensive research documentation he compiled from the medical 
analysis and literature available on the subject of PTSD, contained in Exhibit 2, made part of Dr. 
Heyrend's November 17,2005 Deposition (page 50,  line 13-page 53, line 19; page 42, line 19-page 
46, line 2; page 46, line 3-page 51, line 1 I), and from the consequences of Respondents' repeated 
acts of revictimization. Exhibit 2 is made a specific issue as well in this appeal. 
VALIDITY AND TREATMENT OF PTSD DLAGNOSIS 
It does require a medical expert knowledgeable in PTSD phenomena to conduct the in- 
depth review of a patient's condition to establish a treatment regimen and a diagnostic 
methodology (Def. Ex. 38). See also 3 72-451, Idaho Code. According to the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders @SM-IV), 4" Ed. (soon to be expanded), the American 
Psychiatric Association has identified those five criteria for PTSD mentioned earlier; (1) the 
stressor or traumatic event; (2) re-experiencing, or re-victimizing symptoms, with flashbacks and 
ruminations about the trauma, andfor nightmares; (3) avoidance behavior; (4) depression or 
numbing of general responsiveness with anxiety); and (5) clinically significant distress and 
impairment in significant areas of life (Def. Ex. 37). When this basic criteria is present, an 
individual is diagnosed to have PTSD, and the physical manifestations and brain dyshction 
becomes a resultant component of that disorder. See also Deposition of Dr. F. LaMm Heyrend, 
M.D., page 5, line 17-page 27, line 15. 
The traumatic event causes the traumatic stressor, and that typically involves some type 
of actual or threatened injury or assault. Where there is some fear of serious injury or threat to 
the physical integrity of the individual, these situations constitute traumatic stressors (Def. Ex. 
38). 
Psychometric or mental measurement i n s w e n t s  are useful and valid means to 
objectively demonstrate the symptomatic criteria for PTSD. Data from psychometric tests are 
used to develop objective validation of diagnostic assessments of PTSD. The psychometric 
measures are often used to supplement and objectively substantiate the degree of findings 
gleaned from interview assessments and other clinical sources of diagnostic data. 
A critical component of diagnosing PTSD is the patient's level of functioning pre- and 
post-trauma, as that view will address what has become significantly different. Changes often 
observed as a result of PTSD include the deterioration of concentration, loss of a former 
achievement level, and the erosion of work performance, and a presence of a worsening in 
aspects of physical health, changes in interpersonal relationships, seclusion and loss of interest in 
leisure activities and family role functioning. 
Electroencephalograms (EEG) have been utilized by these experts for modeling and 
clinically mapping aspects of brain activity, and taking "snapshots" of activity will find 
symptoms of the physical change present in patients who are suffering extensively from 
conditions such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Schizophrenia, Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder, advanced signs of alcoholism, and neurophysiology resulting in learning 
disabilities, and explosive behaviors in adolescents. 
Dr. Heyrend had chosen to make this mental and physical disorder a major part of his 
life-long history in the analysis of complex psychiatric behavior and physical manifestations of 
injury, and has chosen to use psychometric tests in his study of the condition, and has 
documented his analysis with over 10,000 (yes, ten thousand) EEGs of patient analysis (Cl. Ex. 
41), and has utilized that mechanism to objectively confirm the degree of the traumatic impact to 
show the presence of physical injury, so he could better determine a preferred method of 
treatment and intervention. EEG neurotherapy and neurofeedback is a well-established process, 
and has become an accepted method to get at an objective analysis of the brain condition for 
treating PTSD military veterans (Cl. Ex. 49), which has become a well-known venue of study 
and environment of this trauma analysis, due to the levels of stress and development of disorders 
from acute and chronic stress. Their study of such a vast assessment of the neurological 
conditions of patients has confirmed the physical damage to the brain as part of the basis of this 
medically recognized scientific fact 
The "mental-physical" injury is well-accepted in medical and legal fields, and is a 
resultant deterioration of a physical state caused by a psychological or psychiatric 
confrontational event that arises out of some perceived trauma, more susceptible in some than in 
others, and does occur during the course of employment, travels, combat, or any perceived 
hostile environment or threat of any particular venue when trauma enters the equation. 
Dr. Heyrend's medically diagnosed opinion was well documented, and comes from years of 
analysis and treatment of this disorder and other physical and behavioral disorders, and based upon 
clinical signs he observed, responses from intmsive examinations, victimized reactions and 
ruminations, observing and documenting physical manifestations, understanding characteristics 
from viewing mental activity and assessing physical resultant injuries, detailed analysis and 
attention given to the criteria addressed in the DSM-IF', and his EEG analysis that has objectively 
demonstrated the effects of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) upon brain function, confirming 
brain function impairment. He has had the benefit of ongoing observations as the treating physician 
during his years of providing treatment and therapy to address the disorder and the physically 
challenged condition. He has given a medical opinion, to a medical certainty, Appellant has 
sustained a PTSD injury, a "mental-physical" injury, with resulting physical manifestations, caused 
as a result of the catastrophic, traumatic, abrasive, intrusive and threatening course of conduct 
utilized by County officials in this accusational interrogation setting conducted July 20, 1999, an 
unfortunate consequence of stress where detectives elected to go grossly beyond any beneficial and 
intended focus of their inqujS all too much like a military forward accusatory style of 
interrogation, to frighten the subject, and set into motion a course of psychological ramifications 
that has leR this individual so devastated as to suffer a permanent physical change in the brain from 
the intensity of the trauma, causing her to become physically impaired and disabled as a result, to a 
degree of being diagnosed to a level of approximately 50% loss of a normal human behavioral 
function with a resulting permanent impairment (November 17, 2005 Deposition of Dr. Heyrend, 
page 43-46). 
Dr. Heyrend's forty-eight years of continuous, in-depth service to the community as an 
intense practicing physician and psychiatrist in Idaho, has made him a nationally recognized and 
published expert on these intriguing forms of brain disorders, and his medical opinion is the 
supporting basis of Appellant's PTSD injury (Cl. Ex. 40). 
It has become known, in recent months, that the "class motto" of the recently graduating 
Class of 2007 from the POST Academy (training school for law enforcement officers), has been 
publicly announced to be: "Don't Suffer PTSD: Go Out And Cause It." That well 
demonstrates the POST Academy has some awareness of stress injuries, and its effects on human 
behavior. Hopefully, this class motto does not become part of the expected policy or practice of 
our law enforcement agencies, to describe their workplace behavior or their treatment of the 
general public, but it demonstrates a level of awareness that overzealous conduct may be found 
in the training behavior, and that is a driving force in investigators, and consequences like this 
suggest such behavior might be better suited for hard-minded use at Guantanamo Bay, rather 
than being used on soft-spoken gentle-minded loyal County employees in Boise, Idaho. 
WHETHER FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
RECOMMENDATION OF THIS REFEREE, TOGETHER WITH THE "FINAL" ORDER 
OF THE COMMISSION, AND THEIR ORDER DENYING CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION, WERE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS ORDERS ENTERED 
CONTRARY TO LAW. 
Unfortunately for Appellant, the Referee assigned to this case has contradicted the 
provisions of 5 72-708, Idaho Code; the case authority identified in Hite v. Kulhenak Bldg. 
Contractor, 96 Idaho 70, 72, 524 P.2d 531, 533 (1974); and the latest authority of Stolle v. 
Bennett, 144 Idaho 44, 156 P.3d 545 (2007). These Commission proceedings have become 
"circumstantial", "complex" and "costly", and does suggest to Appellant to be the result of an 
abuse of discretion by the Commission to "justify" denial of Worker's Compensation benefits to 
PTSD patients, contrary to the stated purpose of Idaho's Worker's Compensation Law. 
Appellant does challenge the Referee's Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation (Ag. R., p. 
1629-1653), the final Order of the Commission (Ag. R., p. 1654-1655), and the "rubber- 
stamped" denial of Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration (Ag. R., p. 1768-1769), as said 
Orders are arbitrary, capricious and contrary to Idaho law, specifically being 5 67-5279, Idaho 
Code. 
In a manner comparable to this Court's decision in Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 141 
Idaho 342, 344-346, 109 P.3d 1084 (2005), the Ada County Sheriffs Office, through its Legal 
Advisor, R. Monte MacConnell, possessed actual and sufficient notice and knowledge of Ms. 
Gibson's July 20, 1999 psychological workplace injury, both orally and from written documents 
(Cl. Ex. 8, 10 & ll), as demands began to be made by him on July 28, 1999, for Claimant to 
resign (Cl. Ex. 3). By then, she was already under a doctor's care, which fact demonstrated a 
medical expense and a claim for medical treatment and medical care was known to the County. 
These communications later confirmed the extent of her doctor's care, and with repeated 
scheduling of "informal proceedings", the County was informed such confrontational settings 
were unacceptable to the treating physician because of the stressful damage it would cause. That 
information and other events was communicated by Claimant's counsel's letter (with 
attachments) to the County, in response to need for medical coverage claims, and why Claimant 
had to remain under doctor's care (Cl. Ex. 35, 36, 37, 38 & 39; Def. Ex. 11). Eventually, a letter 
was sent to the Director of the Idaho Industrial Commission, Mr. Gary Stivers, on May 15,2001 
(Cl. Ex. 8). As noted on page 2, paragraph 5 of Claimant's Exhibit 8, Claimant's counsel 
explained to Mr. Stivers he made repeated verbal attempts to the Sheriffs Advisor to submit the 
"incident to the Idaho Industrial Commission as a Worker's Compensation Claim, and to United 
Heritage Mutual Life Insurance Company for Short-Term Disability", as medical expenses were 
accumulating and no other medical coverage was available, as the County had cancelled all of 
Ms. Gibson's medical benefits beginning September, 1999 (Cl. Ex. 8, p. 8) Mr. Stivers replied 
on June 8, 2001 (Cl. Ex. 7), stating, "Our investigation revealed no workers' compensation claim 
was filed on behalf of Stacy Gibson", and "The reason given [by Ada County] was that Ms. 
Gibson did not request that a claim be filed". 
Under Idaho law, knowledge of the employer, however it is gained, makes the employer 
liable to the employee for those benefits, even in situations where the employee had given no 
notice of any kind at all. See Page v. McCain Foodr, Inc., supra; see also 8 72-704, Idaho Code. 
The Commission could not reasonably conclude that even though Claimant was placed 
immediately on leave, after a traumatic encounter, 3 days later she is under a doctor's care for 
depression and acute stress disorder, and then demands for resignation are made or criminal 
charges were being filed, along with repeated requests for informal hearings and repeated 
responses that Claimant was under doctor's care from the traumatic encounter she endured and 
had to avoid any confrontational settings to avoid fixther injury to her health and physical 
welfare, such facts would not constitute sufficient awareness of an injury or claim to the County 
would be an arbitrary and capricious conclusion. The written communications contained in 
Claimant's Exhibit 8, 10 & 11 were adequate confia t ion of the knowledge of the event and 
Claimant's injury to Ada County, and does give appropriate effect to the remedial purpose of 
Idaho's Worker's Compensation Law. To suggest otherwise would be an arbitrary 
determination, contrary to law. Claimant's forced leave, such that she could not personally give 
notice to a supervisor at Ada County for her workplace injury, and being placed almost 
immediately under a doctor's care, would not be a bar to her claim for Worker's Compensation 
benefits, as Ada County had complete awareness of the event and the injury, and has never 
suffered any prejudice as the employer, and there was constant endeavor to identify the extent of 
her injury. The Sheriff even had the County Doctor, Dr. Charles Steuart, M.D., examine 
Claimant on October 5, 1999 (Ag. R., p. 319; CI. Ex. 10, 11, & 13, p. 33), and he too confmed 
she could not be exposed to any confrontational settings, because of her mental and physical 
state (C1. Ex. 11). The Sheriff, his Legal Advisor, and the physician under County contract, 
each had immediate knowledge of Claimant's wor!splace psychological encounter and injury, 
and each successive day through the 27" day of December 1999 (Cl. Ex. 3, 8, 10 & 11, and 
documents included therewith). 
In Taylor v. Soran Restaurant, Znc., 131 Idaho 525, 960 P.2d 1254 (1998), the Court 
stated: 
"Although section 72-702 requires that notice of an employee's injuries be made 
in writing, "[olral notice to the employer may provide the employer with actual 
knowledge of an injury, thus obviating the necessity of a written notice. Murray- 
Donahue v. National Car Rental Licensee Ass h, 127 Idaho 337, 340, 900 P.2d 
1348, 1351 (1995). Oral Notice must be made within the statutory time for giving 
notice. Stoddard v. Mason's Blue Link Stores, 55 Idaho 609, 45 P.2d 597 
(1935)". 
Ada County, as Claimant's employer, was required under $ 72-604, Idaho Code, to file a 
report ($ 72-602(1), Idaho Code) to the Idaho Industrial Commission of any injury which 
requires treatment by a physician. The County knew Claimant began treatment on July 23, 1999, 
three days after the encounter, and was under doctor's care for months thereafter (CI. Ex. 35-39, 
42 & 58 ). She had been ostracized from the workplace, and then placed on leave, without pay, 
while she was under a doctor's continuing care, repeatedly discussed and known to the County. 
See Petry v. Spaulding Drywall, 117 Idaho 382, 384, 788 P.2d 197 (1990); Tonahill v. Legrand 
I Johnson Cont. Co., 131 Idaho 737, 741, 963 P.2d 1174 (1998). The statute of limitation 
addressed in § 72-701, Idaho Code, does not commence until Ada County has filed the required 
report with the Commission; clearly Ada County knew well of Claimant's medical attention and 
was repeatedly told she was still under doctor's care and would be for some foreseeable future, 
and that became medically imperative only three days after the encounter had occurred. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code, 5 72-604, the one-year filing requirement under these specific 
facts, cannot apply, as Ada County, its Sheriffs Office and its legal and medical staff personnel, 
had adequate knowledge of Ms. Gibson's traumatic encounter that resulted in her psychological 
workplace injury, and the County and its responsible agents did willfully decline to file the 
report as required by $72-602(1), Idaho Code, to avoid medical liability, after repeated attempts 
by her counsel notifying them of her claim and her injury, even after it was confirmed by Dr. 
Charles Steuart, the County physician, during attempts to repeatedly schedule informal meetings, 
but rejected by both Dr. Steuart and the treating physician, Dr. Stephen E. Spencer, in 1999 (C1. 
Ex. 11, 35-39; Def. Ex. 11). Ada County Sheriffs Office agents simply failed to report Mrs. 
Gibson's injury, as confirmed by the June 8, 2001 letter of Mr. Gary Stivers, Director of the 
Idaho Industrial Commission (Cl. Ex. 4 & 7). 
WHETHER THE REFEREE'S ORDER TO STRIKE EXHIBIT 2 OF DR. F. LAMARR 
HEYREMD'S NOVEMBER 17, 2006 DEPOSITION FROM THE RECORD WAS AN 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION, ARBITRARY AND CONTRARY TO LAW. 
The November 17,2005 post-hearing deposition of Dr. Heyrend contains the materials on 
his diagnosis, the identification of the physical injury, the impairments and permanent damage, 
and his treatment and supportive analysis used to confirm his clinical diagnosis. During that oral 
examination of Dr. Heyrend, he gave a well-documented clinically developed basis for his 
medical opinion concerning his diagnosis of her impairment as a consequence of her injuries, his 
treatment, and use of medications. See November 17,2005 Deposition of Dr. Heyrend. He had 
exhausted much effort to prepare a compilation of Internationally recognized medical treatises 
(Exhibit 2 of Dr. Heyrend's November 17, 2005 Deposition) to assist Respondents' 
understanding of the disorder, and support his well-documented contentions Ms. Gibson does 
suffer PTSD, with resulting physical changes in her brain function, and the objectively 
confirmed physical brain injuries and changes he diagnosed. 
In the Referee's findings, conclusions and recommendation, however, it was ordered 
Exhibit 2 of Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend's November 17, 2006 Deposition be struck &om the 
record, stating: 
"JRP 10 requires that parties disclose proposed evidence timely before the 
hearing. It states that evidence may not be "developed, manufactured, or 
discovered after the hearing, except upon good cause shown". (Emphasis 
added). 
Dr. Heyrend was disclosed as being a medical expert and the treating physician who 
would testify as to Claimant's PTSD condition, and he would obviously utilize his entire file 
compilation and related research materials to support his opinions and conclusions at any hearing 
or deposition. Dr. Heyrend stated in his November 16,2005 Affidavit (Ag. R., p. 1468-1474), he 
had extensively researched, compiled and printed his Exhibit 2 file materials prior to the date 
scheduled for the hearing to be held on September 12, 2005. It was certainly made available for 
review and examination in the deposition testimony and responses, and it was defense counsel 
who actually invited Dr. Heyrend to compile this material during an earlier deposition taken of 
Dr. Heyrend on May 5,2005, long before the hearing date scheduled to take place on September 
12, 2005. Dr. Heyrend took up the invitation £?om Mr. Bauman, seeing it was an opportunity to 
educate both defense counsel and the Industrial Commission, and could serve to educate the 
Referee, Mr. Donohue, as well, as PTSD is not a well understood phenomenon, as one might like 
to assume, despite the medical and legal recognition in medical science and legal decisions prior 
to Claimant's traumatic encounter. The Referee, choosing arbitrarily to perceive the meaning of 
Rule 10, J.R.P. to be a bar to the use of evidence, decided to suppress this medical material in an 
effort to prevent equitable use of the medical documentary research material that existed and 
should be known to and shared by the parties. This Exhibit 2 was a compilation actually invited 
to be prepared by counsel for a party to the dispute, who wanted it assembled for later 
consideration. Clearly, Dr. Heyrend had a medical basis for his opinions, as he was aware of all 
the medical analysis, and he wanted it documented with his file research and wanted to make it 
available to support what he wanted to say in his live testimony, planned to take place on 
September 12, 2005. The deposition format, however, was instead used as the evidentiary 
gathering process of medical testimony instead of taking his live testimony. This was decided, in 
part, because of his mother's demise (Ag. R., p. 1425; Ag. R., p. 1468-1474), as well as the 
convenience it would allow the parties and the Referee. The contents of Exhibit 2 were made 
part of Dr. Heyrend's office file, and it was produced for review during his post-hearing 
testimony on November 17, 2005 (Ag. R., p. 1468-1474). Defendants benefited from a better 
understanding of the basis of the opinion, but apparently don't want the medical science in this 
Record, as it serves then to c o n f m  the arbitrary nature of the decision of the Referee to reject 
Claimant's right to recover benefits. The production of this type of evidentiary disclosure is part 
of the expert testimony as would have been given at the hearing, and that was given at his post- 
hearing deposition, instead of the scheduled hearing, as decided by agreement of the parties and 
the Referee (Ag. R., p. 1425). Doctors use medical treatises and studies to form and support 
their medical opinions and that is no surprise to anyone. See also Ag. R., p. 1549-1566. 
Exhibit 2 of Dr. Heyrend's November 17, 2005 Deposition presents a gathering of 
medical definitions, research documents and medical treatises compiled for submission with his 
testimony as supporting data to be presented during the Commission hearing on September 12, 
2005. It was not manufactured, discovered or developed after the hearing date (Ag. R., p. 1468- 
1474), in any event. Exhibit 2, along with medical literature available from the National Institute 
of Mental Health, provides an understanding of Ms. Gibson's PTSD condition, and identifies 
how and why a physical injury and physical manifestations occur, being due to changes in 
specific structure changes in the brain, causing physical damage and impairment that will impact 
lifestyle in a permanent way. The physical injuries to the brain caused fi-om psychological 
trauma, has also been proven in this literature to cause a person to be susceptible to infectious 
diseases, and increased risk of hypertension and cardiovascular disease. See Heyrend's Exhibit 
2, Document 5 & 13. Physical injury to the brain is not limited just to a PTSD disorder; 
Claimant's Panic Disorder is a physical disorder as well, accompanied by physical injury to the 
brain, with physical manifestations of physical and bodily injury. See Heyrend's Exhibit 2, 
Document 8 & 11. In his November 17,2005 Deposition @. 14, L 5-p. 16, L 15; p. 25, L 6-p. 
26, L 16), Dr. Heyrend described the fight-or-flight response as it relates to PTSD and to Panic 
Disorder. The documents in Exhibit 2 c o n f m  physical injury to the brain and that does support 
Dr. Heyrend's diagnosis of injury from her PTSD Veyrend's Exhibit 2, Documents 1, 2, 3, 4, 
11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18 & 19), and does occur from a Panic Disorder as Dr. Joseph Lipetzky found. 
See Heyrend's Exhibit 2, Documents 1,2,3,4,6, 8, 10, 1 1 & 13. 
An agency hearing officer has no authority to strike or exclude any substantial and 
competent evidence presented by an expert, even upon a belief the evidence is of hearsay nature, 
as hearsay evidence in these agency proceedings is admissible. See Lockhart v. State, Dept. of 
Fish & Game, 127 Idaho 546, 550,903 P.2d 135 (Ct. App. 1995); Hoyt v. Morrison-Knudsen 
Co., I00 Idaho 659,661,603 P.2d 993,995 (1979); see also 4 67-5251(1), Idaho Code. 
When ruling on the admissibility of evidence, a hearing officer must admit evidence to 
assist, rather than frustrate, development of the record. As stated, Exhibit 2 was compiled at 
the invitation of Respondents to assist in their understanding of PTSD injuries, and was prepared 
for presentation with his testimony and the medical files, which was initially planned to occur on 
September 12, 2005. It was not "discovered", "developed" or "manufactured" after September 
12,2005, but rather was published literature, used by experts, and compiled by Dr. Heyrend and 
his staff before September 12, 2005, upon invitation by Respondents' counsel (Ag. R., p. 1468- 
1474). 
In Stolle v. Bennett, 144 Idaho 44, 156 P.3d 545 (2007), , the Court noted 5 67-5251, 
Idaho Code, is what controls the admission of evidence in Industrial Commission proceedings, 
governed by the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. 4 67-525 1 identified upon what conditions 
a Hearing Officer is allowed to exclude evidence from the record. By statute, evidence in an 
agency proceeding may be excluded only when it is: 
"irrelevant, unduly repetitious, or excludable on constitutional or statutory 
grounds, or on the basis of any evidentiary privilege provided by statute or 
recognized in the courts of this state. All other evidence may be admitted if it is 
of a type commonly relied upon by prudent persons in the conduct of their 
affairs". (Emphasis added). 
7be literature is relevant to the diagnosis, and is relied upon by experts involved in the 
analysis and diagnosis of PTSD, its physical damage components, and its treatment by 
psychotherapy and medications. Though the experience, technical competence, and specialized 
knowledge of a Commission Referee may be utilized in the evaluation of evidence, he may not 
utilize his expertise as a substitute for evidence, and it would be arbitrary for him to do so, since 
administrative decisions must be based upon substantial evidence and reasoned findings, to allow 
for effective judicial review. That process becomes meaningless if relevant material known to 
exist as reliable and scientific research data, and relied upon by a doctor as a basis of an opinion, 
is not to be allowed in the record by the agency. It becomes reversible error to do so. See 
Laurino v. Board of Professional Discipline, 137 Idaho 596,602, 51 P.3d 410 (2002); see also § 
67-5248, Idaho Code. 
Without dweiling on the obvious reasons why a referee would not want a record replete 
with supporting materials that validates the basis of physical injuries, physical manifestations, 
and a clear basis for confirming a PTSD diagnosis, let it suffice to say an objective seen by 
Appellant has been the desire to limit, avoid, and deny expensive claims from Bowing into the 
system from trauma caused injuries. These type claims are out there, and are just and equitable 
in their own right for proper compensation. Regardless of the reason, the fact remains it serves 
to be an abuse of discretion, arbitrary and capricious for a referee to exclude compiled medical 
documentation in existence, and that was not discovered, developed or manufactured affer 
September 12,2005; it existed, was compiled, and was relied upon as a scientific basis to support 
the expert's opinion. Such an order of exclusion is contrary to a referee's authority and to the 
law, and must be set aside with an order of inclusion of all materials in Exhibit 2, to become part 
of the deposition record and basis for the opinion of the medical diagnosis fkom the medical 
science that confirms the physical injury and right to benefits for this injury. 
IV. 
WHETHER THE CONSTRUCTION, VALIDITY AND COMMISSION'S FORCIBLE 
APPLICATION OF IDAHO'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, 8 72-433, 5 72-434, 
AND 8 72-435, IDAHO CODE, IS A DIRECT VIOLATION OF THE STATUTE AND 
APPELLANT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND EQUAL 
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE 1 4 ~ ~  AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 
AS IT CAUSED CLAIMANT TO BE "REVICTLMIZED". 
The meaning of a statute and its application is a matter over which the appellate court 
exercises kee review. See Woodburn v. Manco Prods., Znc., 137 Idaho 502,504,50 P.3d 997,992 
(2002). "Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous , legislative history and other 
extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of 
the legislature." See State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829,25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001). See also Horner v, 
Sani-Top, Inc., Docket No. 31588, 141 P.3d 1099 (2006). Here we have statutes that may be in 
conflict. 
On June 15, 2005, pursuant to Rule 15, Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure (J.R.P.), 
Claimant filed a Petition and supporting Memorandum with the Commission, seeking Declaratow 
Ruling on the application, construction and validity of Idaho's Workmen's Compensation Law, as 
reflected by Orders entered by the Commission Referee, Douglas A. Donohue, on March 25, 2005, 
April 12, 2005, May 10, 2005, May 12, 2005, and June 3, 2005. See Appendix 1. Claimant's 
Petition was sought to materially advance an orderly resolution of this dispute and ripen the dispute 
for later appeal. It involved the concerns: 
1. Whether a claimant can be compelled to participate in a series of adversarial 
medical examinations without allowing a claimant the accomiodating effects of her primary 
care psychiatrist and therapist to accompany her at such intrusive evaluations that could invoke a 
revictimization from the reoccurrence of trauma, when such emotional and physical reactions 
from confkontational proceedings are known to result in further injury and setback to a 
claimant's health and welfare, when such accommodation is contemplated by the applicability of 
9 72-433(2), Idaho Code. The Orders entered by the Referee on March 25,2005 (Ag. R., p. 860- 
861), April 12, 2005 (Ag. R., p. 865-866), May 10, 2005 (Ag. R., p. 944-945), May 12, 2005 
(Ag. R., p. 1067-1068) and June 3,2005 (Ag. R., p. 1109-1 110), were contrary to existing case 
law, specifically designed to accommodate Defendants' medical advocate(s) only, and not 
accommodate a claimant or her primary care physician in any manner. 
2. Whether a claimant can be compelled to participate in a series of medical 
examinations by paid advocates, without allowing needed time and treatment required to 
stabilize a claimant from earlier episodes of revictimization and resulting injury. Claimant's 
stabilization was needed to subdue the severe re-victimization effects and resulting psychological 
trauma; that Claimant's treating therapist needed to address the trauma with medicinal 
intervention and psychotherapy sessions to stabilize Claimant *om the negative effects of 
Defendants' earlier intrusive and exhaustive re-evaluations and re-victimizations conducted by 
their medical advocates. 
3. Whether a claimant participating in these intrusive evaluations, before being 
treated and stabilized, is acting in a manner contrary to the medical advice of her primary care 
psychiatrist, and consequently become subject to the exclusionary effects of $ 72-435, Idaho 
Code, for participating in a course of conduct knowingly unreasonable and injurious to her 
health, that will retard and seriously impede and imperil her medical recovery. 
4. Whether a claimant can be ordered by the Industrial Commission to attend and 
cooperate with a scheduled evaluation conducted by medical advocates, when deliberately 
unaccommodating to a claimant and her primary care physician, and scheduled only to 
accommodate the availability of a Defendants' advocate, contrary to the accommodating 
requirements contemplated by § 72-433(2), Idaho Code. 
5. Whether a claimant can be ordered by the Industrial Commission to reimburse 
charges of Dr. Richard Wilson, M.D., a paid advocate, for a "missed appointment", when 
Defendants and the Industrial Commission were fully advised, prior to the alleged "missed 
appointment" Claimant's attendance at any such controversial and adversarial medical 
evaluations was contrary to and working against the medical advice given by her primary care 
physician, and would cause fbrther physical harm and injury, if not treated and stabilized. 
Unforttmately, after being fully advised of the genuine threat against Claimant's health, 
the Referee entered Orders on May 10,2005 (Ag. R., p. 944-945) and May 12,2005 (Ag. R., p. 
1067-1068), which ordered Claimant attend and cooperate with an examination by Dr. Wilson, 
contrary to the medical advice of Claimant's primary care psychiatrist. Then, in his June 3,2005 
Order (Ag. R., p. 1109-1 110), the Referee ordered Claimant attend and cooperate with Dr. 
Wilson, upon Dr. Wilson's availability only. 
The Referee then unilaterally ordered Claimant reimburse Dr. Wilson (Ag. R., p. 1109- 
11 10). Claimant continues to object to any order directing reimbursement of Dr. Wilson for a 
non-accommodating appointment, unilaterally scheduled by Defendants, in light of the injury to 
her health and the existing controversy concerning the construction, validity and applicability of 
5 72-433(2), 5 72-434 and 5 72-435, Idaho Code. 
Prior to this, on April 6, 2005, Defendants' counsel had unilaterally scheduled Claimant 
for an evaluation with Dr. Brownsmith on April 14, 2005, without accommodating Claimant or 
her primary care psychiatrist. Before that event would be acceptable, Claimant's counsel 
suggested dates that would accommodate both Claimant and Dr. Heyrend by his notice on April 
8,2005. 
On April 12, 2005, the Commission Referee, after telephone conference on April 11, 
2005, entered an order which stated "the availability of any other physician was not a basis 
for scheduling" (Ag. R., p. 865-866), thus abrogating the meaning and application of 5 72- 
433(2), Idaho Code, and nullifying Claimant's right to have her primary care physician in 
attendance at any further evaluations, already having identified a revictimization consequence 
had occurred and would likely occur again. 
On April 14, 2005, under protest, Claimant complied with the Referee's March 25, 2005 
Order, and did attend a follow-up evaluation by Dr. Brownsmith. After being questioned for over 
two (2) hours, Claimant experienced the revictimized result, and was diagnosed by Dr. Heyrend 
after reviewing the video-tape taken of the encounter. Claimant had suffered a severe panic attack 
(Cl. Ex. 61). 
Because Dr. Brownsmith is a psychologist and may not regularly deal with disorders or 
physical injuries in the brain, like a psychiatrist does, and especially in these disorders, as Dr. 
Heyrend does in treatment and course of therapy, it would be logical to conclude Dr. 
Brownsmith must be viewed as lacking appropriate training, education and skills to diagnose and 
evaluate a Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and the associated physical brain injuries. To 
demonstrate that view, Dr. Brownsmith was not able to assist Claimant with any means in her 
immediate need of medical treatment or therapy to calm Claimant's traumatic reaction. Claimant 
was left only to leave Dr. Brownsmith's office in a state of hyperventilation, shaking and crying 
uncontrollably, experiencing dizziness, blurred vision, and in need of medical attention and 
treatment, giving rise for the need to immediately secure help from Dr. Heyrend. 
This April 14' session came only as a result of the Referee's March 25, 2005 and April 
12, 2005 Orders (Ag. R., p. 860-861; p. 865-866) , directing Claimant attend the additional 
evaluation by Dr. Brownsmith, scheduled solely at Dr. Brownsmith's choosing, with no 
consideration given to Claimant or her primary care doctor's schedule for available participation 
needed for protection, as contemplated under 5 72-433(2), Idaho Code. 
Thereafter, on April 28, 2005, we find Jewel Owen at State Insurance Fund, without 
providing Claimant any accommodation required by 5 72-433(2), Idaho Code, also unilaterally 
scheduled Claimant to be evaluated on May 11,2005, by Dr. Richard W. Wilson, M.D. (Cl. Ex. 
74), who was a local neurologist and a known medical advocate. On May 9, 2005, Claimant 
submitted an Objection to this unilateral, unaccommodating effort of Defendants (Ag. R., p. 884- 
9 19). 
On May 10, 2005, Claimant filed a Motion, requesting the Commission undertake 
reconsideration of its May 10,2005 Order (Ag. R., p. 946-973, as that Order required Claimant 
submit to more intrusive examinations by advocates, brought into the medical-mix of assessment 
by a neurologist. In support of Claimant's Motion, the Affidavit of Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend, 
M.D. was prepared, and he verified his medical opinion, as Claimant's primary care psychiatrist, 
that Ms. Gibson was suffering significantly from physical effects of Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) caused by the County, and had been revictimized twice already by Dr. Cynthia 
Brownsmith (Ag. R., p. 948-968; C1. Ex. 43 & 44). 
On May 10, 2005, the Commission Referee issued an Order compelling Claimant attend 
and cooperate with the examination by Dr. Wilson, unilaterally scheduled earlier by Jewel 
Owen, again unaccommodating to Claimant or Dr. Heyrend, as required by Idaho law (Ag. R., p. 
944-945) 
On May 12, 2005, the Commission Referee issued a further Order, compelling Claimant 
to attend and cooperate with Dr. Wilson, and again, the order was unreasonable and 
unaccommodating to Claimant (Ag. R., p. 1067-1068). 
On June 3, 2005, the Commission Referee entered another Order, again compelling 
Claimant to attend and cooperate in the evaluation by Dr. Wilson, and "scheduling is at Dr. 
Wilson's availability only" (Ag. R., p. 1109-1 110). 
These Orders of May 10,2005 (Ag. R, p. 944-945), May 12,2005 (Ag. R., p. 1067-1068) 
and June 3, 2005 (Ag. R., p. 1109-1 IIO), were in error, and the Commission Order of June 3, 
2003 (Ag. R., p. 1109-11 10) did erroneously order Claimant to reimburse Dr. Wilson for an 
alleged "missed appointment", despite this need for medical accommodation to protect the health 
of Claimant. Each of these Orders are contrary to Claimant's health and welfare, and should be 
set aside, and the Order compelling payment of Dr. Wilson's bill vacated in its entirety. 
v. 
WHETHER APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS, AS A 
MATTER OF RIGHT AND LAW, FOR ALL PROCEEDINGS BELOW, AND ON 
APPEAL. 
Idaho Code, 5 12-1 17, provides for attorney fees to a person, in any administrative or civil 
judicial proceeding, involving adverse parties with a state agency, a city, a county or other taxing 
district. That statute does allow the Court to award the person reasonable attorney fees, witness fees 
and reasonable expenses, if the Court finds in favor of the person, and Ends the Agency acted 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law. See Gunter v. Magic Valley, 143 Idaho 63, 137 P.3d 450 
(2006); Neighbors For A Health Gold Fork v. Valley County, Docket No. 33552, Idaho Supreme 
Court, Filed December 27,2007. 
Appellant requested an award of attorney fees from the Commission in accordance with 5 
72-804, Idaho Code, as the actions of Ada County in these Worker's Compensation proceedings 
had been solely designed to deny a valid claim for benefits, beginning with the decision to refuse 
even to report the injury, known to the County to be required when immediate care from a 
physician is necessary. The history of bad faith was well-documented: Claimant had been put on 
leave without any hearing, the degraded leave status, without pay, without a hearing, took no 
formal action to conduct a hearing to address status or the existence of cause for termination, and 
then refused to disburse lawhl pay which was due her, then denied any accounting on the 
regular wage and overtime wage disputes, then would not accept the fact she had physical 
injuries, despite the medical science and obvious symptoms, chose to deny benefits to which she 
was entitled, and would elect to do so by the use of paid advocates who knew of, but would 
avoid the medical science on PTSD diagnosis, physical brain changes, physical injury and 
physical manifestations. This conduct must be viewed as grossly unreasonable, and the 
legitimate purpose of the Industrial Commission is to bestow justly due benefits, not attempt to 
abrogate with capricious behavior, to avoid the exposure of liability to address a course that has 
caused injury from traumatic behavior, and the entire experience has served to cause ongoing 
injury, expense, and grossly prolong the instability and stifling of the healing process of 
Claimant, committed in what appears to be a designed effort, as the episodes of revictimization 
was a known consequence to occur, and Defendants were told it would serve to be damaging, 
and did seriously retard Appellant's stability, and prolong the severity from the PTSD condition. 
Idaho Code 5 72-804 states that: 
"If the commission or  any court before whom any proceedings are 
brought under this law determines that the employer or his surety 
contested a claim for compensation made by an injured employee . . 
.without reasonable ground, or that an employer or his surety neglected or 
refused within a reasonable time after receipt of a written claim for 
compensation to pay to the injured employee or his dependents the 
compensation provided by law, or without reasonable grounds 
discontinued payment of compensation as provided by law justly due and 
owing to the employee or his dependents, the employer shall pay 
reasonable attorney fees in addition to the compensation provided by this 
law. In all such cases the fees of attorneys employed by injured employees 
or their dependents shall be fixed by the commission." (Emphasis added). 
The plain meaning of Idaho Code 5 72-804 is to compel the Commission to take action, and 
"shall" award attorney fees to the employee when the employer's denial of compensation was 
unreasonable. Though the amount of the award is subject to the discretion of the Commission, 
rehsing to award any fees where the employer unreasonably denied compensation to the employee 
is a decision beyond the "outer boundaries" of the Commission's discretion, and the Commission's 
refisal to award attorney fees is an abuse of discretion. See Bradley v. Washington Group Intern., 
141 Idaho 655, 115 P.3d 746 (2005). 5 72-804 requires attorney fees be awarded where the 
employer's actions were unreasonable. See Page v. McCain Foods, Docket No. 33158, Idaho 
Supreme Court, Filed January 3 1,2008. 
In Swett v. St. Alphonsus Reg? Med Ctr., 136 Idaho 74, 29 P.3d 385 (2001), the Court 
considered whether the Commission could make an attorney fee award under LC. 5 72-804 based 
on a percentage of the benefits awarded to the employee. The Court held the Commission could 
,, 
base an award "on a percentage of benefits awarded", so long as those factors articulated in 
Hogaboom v. Economy Mattress, 107 Idaho 13, 684 P.2d 990 (1984) were considered. If the 
Commission stated it had considered the Hogaboom factors, the award may be based on a 
percentage of benefits awarded to the employee and would be proper. Swett, 136 Idaho at 78,29 
P.3d at 389. 
CONCLUSION 
The Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder suffered by Appellant is medically and legally 
defined as a "mental-physical" injury, and is compensable under Idaho's Workers' 
compensation law, and Claimant has suffered an impairment and disability rating from this 
physical injury, identified to approximate a 50% impairment of normal function. 
Dr. Heyrend's medical opinion remains absolute: Claimant suffers a severe case of PTSD 
with the presence of obvious physical manifestations and scientifically confirmed physical injury 
to components of the brain, caused by the Ada County officials on July 20, 1999, and Claimant 
was revictimized each time she was confronted by advocates of the County and State insurance 
Fund who demonstrated an agenda to be intrusive in their evaluation of Appellant, without 
accommodating Claimant and her physician in any manner. Dr. Heyrend confirmed the 
conkontational episodes of these paid advocates on June 20,2003, June 24,2003, July 11,2003, 
April 14,2005, and by Dr. Wilson on June 28,2005 (Cl. Ex. 65) and August 23,2005 (Ag. R., p. 
1188), observing repeated re-victimization, and the damaging effect to her treatment and 
physical health; that Dr. Heyrend was required to balance the locus caeruleus structure of 
Claimant's brain, as he has done in other cases, with such "allpa-2 blocking agent" and SSRI 
medications as used in severe cases to reduce the level of anxiety, and structure a pathway for the 
effects of psychotherapy sessions; that he had to provide medical treatment to stabilize her health 
after each of these adversarial proceedings, that caused hi need to intervene in the intrusive and 
damaging process, to protect Claimant against this abusive self-serving conduct. 
Claimant requests an award of attorney fees under $72-804, Idaho Code, as the course of 
conduct taken by Ada County has been pursued in had faith, and has pursued a state of denial, 
despite the medically recognized physical damage and brain function changes associated with 
PTSD and Panic Disorder trauma caused injuries. This conduct has been unreasonable, and by 
their efforts, have served to grossly prolong Claimant's instability and stifle the healing process 
required, and in forther aggravation, has pursued a course of action that has only served to 
revictimize Appellant and retard her stability, which has grossly complicated and extended all 
efforts in the recovery process, at substantial cost and medial expense to Appellant. 
Respondents have shown no desire to seek or administer justice in this case; rather they 
seek to dispute a just claim and promote conduct to encourage the Commission to ignore the 
medical science and documentation of injuries, solely pursued to deny benefits, and to avoid a 
just and fair result. We understand fear of other claims that are founded in PTSD, but the law 
and medical science must prevail. The defense tactics have been pursued to limit the right of 
recovery and no doubt intended to address all PTSD patients, but in doing so here, has exposed 
Appellant to ongoing and prolonged emotional, mental and physical stress, causing intensified 
physical injuries, and potentially causing the impairment and disability to become lasting and of 
permanent effect, with medical bills of mounting concern. This must be seen as bad faith, 
unreasonable and unjust, and an award of attorney fees is in o 
upon appeal. It is incumbent for this Court to be 
Appellant a fair resolution and find some lev 
Dated this 15" day of February 2008. 
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The Claimant above-named, as the party of interest herein, through counsel, 
Vernon K. Smith, and pursuant to Rule 15, Judicial Rules of Practice and 
Procedure (J.R.P.), has requested the ldaho Industrial Commission to enter a 
written declaratory ruling concerning the construction, validity and applicability of 
certain provisions of ldaho Workmen's Compensation law, as reflected in those 
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orders entered by Industrial Commission Referee, Douglas A. Donohue, on March 
25,2005, April 12,2005, May 10,2005, May 12,2005 and June 3,2005. 
Claimant has requested the Commission to grant her relief by (1) entering 
their written declaratory ruling, which has the effect of a final order or judgment, 
and allow Claimant to remain compliant with the medical advice of her primary 
care psychiatrist, permit her physician to continue efforts 'to stabilize Claimant's 
medical condition over such time as needed before being confronted again with 
any order to attend any further adversarial and intrusive evaluations by any 
further medical advocates of Defendants, (2) rejecting and denying the Referee's 
June 3, 2005 order, which required Claimant to reimburse Dr. Wilson for the 
alleged "missed appointment" and assessments billed that had been unilaterally 
scheduled by Defendants, with no cooperation or accommodations for Claimant 
and her primary care psychiatrist, (3) suspend all proceedings in this matter until 
such time the Commission has entered a final written order or judgment, and until 
such time Claimant or Defendants have completed, if necessary, their right to an 
appellate review of these significant and controlling questions of law, and (4) 
schedule a hearing in this matter and allow Claimant the presentation of 
evidence to support the Record for further review, if deemed needed. 
Nature of this Dispute 
The nature of this dispute involves an existing controversy between 
parties concerning the construction, validity and applicability of certain provisions 
of Idaho Workmen's Compensation law, from which there exists a substantial 
difference of opinion advanced between the parties, and a declaratory ruling 
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would materially advance an orderly resolution of some aspects of this dispute, 
or ripen the extent of the dispute for later appeal. This dispute presents the 
following issues: 
1. Whether a Claimant, such as here, can be compelled to participate 
in a series of adversarial medical examinations by known advocates for 
Defendants, now to include Dr. Richard Wilson, and being proposed to be done 
without allowing Claimant any accommodating effects of her primary care 
psychiatrist and therapist to accompany her at these intrusive and re-victimizing 
evaluations, as the emotional and physical reactions from these confrontational 
settings and proceedings has been experienced from the prior intrusive advocacy 
of Defendants' first advocate, Dr. Cynthia Brownsmith. That Claimant contends 
accommodation is contemplated by the applicability of § 72-433 (2), Idaho Code, 
but the orders entered by Referee Donohue on March 25, 2005, April 12, 2005, 
May 10, 2005, May $2, 2005 and June 3, 2005, are contrary to that 
accommodating requirement expressed in the existing case law. These orders 
do not accommodate Claimant and her primary care physician in any manner. 
2. Whether a Claimant, such as here, can be compelled to participate 
in such series of medical examinations, without time allowed to stabilize earlier 
episodes of re-victimization and resulting injury. Claimant's stabilization needs 
have been diagnosed by her psychiatrist to subdue the severe re-victimization 
effects resulting from the renewed psychological trauma; that Claimant's treating 
therapist needs to address the trauma with medical treatment and psychotherapy 
I 
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sessions to stab~l~ze her from the negative effects of the ~ntrusive and exhaustive 
re-victimizations conducted by Defendants' medical advocates. 
3. Whether a Claimant, such as here, by participating in these 
intrusive evaluations, is acting in a forbidden manner as it is contrary to the 
medical advice of her primary care psychiatrist, and consequently could become 
subject to the applicability of the exclusionary effects of § 72-435, ldaho Code, as 
Claimant would be participating in a course of conduct imposed upon her that is 
knowingly unreasonable and injurious to her health, and will retard and has 
seriously impeded and imperiled her medical recovery. 
4. Whether a Claimant, such as here, can be ordered by an Industrial 
Commission Referee to attend such evaluations conducted by Defendants' 
medical advocates, when the scheduling is deliberately unaccommodating to 
Claimant her primary care physician, and in fact scheduled only to 
accommodate the availability of Defendants' advocate, contrary to the 
accommodating requirements contemplated by § 72-433 (2), ldaho Code. 
5. Whether a Claimant, such as here, can be ordered by an Industrial 
Commission Referee to reimburse Defendants for the charges of Dr. Richard 
Wilson, M.D., for what Referee Donohue has characterized in his June 3, 2005 
order as a "missed appointment", when in fact, Defendants and the Industrial 
Commission Referee were fully advised prior to the alleged "missed 
appointment" Claimant's attendance at such a controversial and adversarial 
medical evaluation was contrary to her doctor's medical advice, and working 
against the medical treatment needed and given by her primary care physician, 
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and would cause (not just speculatory) Claimant to have further psychological 
and physical harm and injury, and to a debilitating nature if not treated and 
stabilized. After being fully advised of the threat against Claimant's health, the 
Referee entered the orders on May 10, 2005 and May 12, 2005, directing 
Claimant to attend and cooperate with the examination of Dr. Wilson, contrary to 
the medical opinion, advice and required treatment of Claimant's primary care 
psychiatrist. The June 3, 2005 order from Referee Donohue has again ordered 
Claimant to attend and cooperate with Dr. Wilson, but oniy upon Dr. Wilson's 
availability. 
Of concern, and also an issue in need of declaratory ruling, is the fact 
Defendants have not presented a motion to the Commission requesting Claimant 
be held responsible to pay for the "missed appointment" assessments billed by 
Defendants' medical advocate. The Referee unilaterally ordered Claimant to 
reimburse Dr. Wilson. See Rule 3E, J.R.P. Claimant does vehemently object to 
the entry of any order directing reimbursement to Dr. Wilson for any non- 
accommodating appointment scheduled by Defendants, in light of the existing 
controversy and dispute concerning the construction, validity and applicability of 
3 72-433 (2), 3 72-434 and 3 72-435, Idaho Code. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In early 1997, Claimant decided to seek a career with law enforcement, and 
on July 10, 1997, Claimant became employed as a Records Technician with the 
Ada County Sheriffs Office, located at the Boise State University (BSU) Substation. 
Claimant was employed there as a non-commissioned officer (no arrest powers) to 
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October 15, 1998, when she was promoted and transferred to the main Jail Facillty 
as a Jail Technician. At the time of Claimant's transfer, her gross wages were 
$1,500.00 per month, and the County Payroll Department had been directly 
depositing those wages into a joint checking account she had with her husband. 
Sometime after Claimant's transfer to the Jail Facility on October 16, 1998, 
and before November I, 1998, the Ada County Payroll Department created an error 
in Claimant's wages. Instead of paying Claimant $1,575.00 per month as would be 
due her for wages in light of the pay increase from her promotion, the Ada County 
Payroll Department incorrectly calculated her wages by combining her old wage of 
$1,500.00 with a new wage figure of $1,550.00, creating a wage of $3,050.00, and 
that incorrect figure was directly deposited into the joint checking account. The 
County Payroll Department continued this error for a period of eight (8) months. 
Because Claimant had no involvement with the check register or accounting 
process, and Mr. Gibson never opened bank statements or balanced the checking 
account on any occasion, due to his busy work schedule selling farm equipment, 
they were both unaware monies were actually being deposited into their account in 
excess of her required wages. 
From January 1, 1999 through June 30, .1999, Claimant worked well beyond 
her scheduled regular shifts of four days on, four days off (ten hour days), and she 
accrued 281 hours of overtime. During this same period, Claimant completed 204 
hours of correspondence courses, as was sponsored, recommended, and supplied 
by the County Sheriffs Office. 
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On July 19, 1999, the Sheriff's Office discovered errors had been created in 
accounting, which at first was thought to be &payment for overtime hours owed 
to nine (9) County employees. Claimant was one of the nine. After further 
examination, Payroll thought there may be an overpayment of some wages to 
Claimant. The County Sheriff thereupon ordered detectives to conduct an internal 
investigation regarding the wages of Claimant. On July 20, 1999, and while 
Claimant was on medical leave from outpatient back surgery, Claimant received a 
phone call from a Sheriff detective as she was recovering at home. The detective 
requested she meet him at the Sheriffs Office. Claimant assumed the request was 
for her to participate in more special projects, as she was known by the Department 
to be an employee who cooperated with special work assignments, as she believed 
would help advance her career. 
For tw6 and one-half (2 %) hours on July 20, 1999, two Sheriff detectives 
interrogated Claimant about the wage errors and threatened her with intrusive 
techniques; they called her a thief and a liar, claimed she had collaborated with 
others to intentionally cause these overpayments into the checking account, and 
threatened her with criminal prosecution for the acts of felony grand theft and 
threatened her with incarceration. Claimant perceived these threats as destroying 
her career, her job and her life, causing immediate impact to her physical health, 
safety and well being. It was a death threat to her, as she was aware what 
happens to law enforcement personnel who face the prospect of jail. 
Claimant told the detectives she had no knowledge of any overpayments to 
any account; that all aspects of payroll record-keeping was not her responsibility, 
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and she had nothing to do with the accounting of the joint checklng account, but d ~ d  
agree if excess wages had been deposited, and a refund was immediately needed, 
the County could take her accrued comp time, overtime, holiday time and vacation 
time, as a good faith showing, and the County could then cornplete a full 
reconciliation of all her wage and benefit records, and determine how the wage 
issue could be resolved. 
Approximately one week following this interrogation process, on July 28, 
1999, Claimant's representative received a phone call from R. Monte MacConnell, 
Sheriffs Legal Advisor, who stated the message be relayed to Claimant that the 
Sheriff wanted Claimant terminated, and if she drd not resign from the Sheriffs 
Office, she would be processed with felony charges for grand theft and fired 
immed~ately. A cascade of events followed, including false statements 
expressed by the Ada County Sheriff and his agents, saying Claimant was 
involved in the error, the effect of which was to escalate the County's errors into 
contention Claimant was at fault, and she knew or should have known of the 
overpayment, and immediately reported it. 
That in violation of County employment policy, and contrary to a consensual 
alternative to receiving pay, while the investigation was in a continued state, 
Claimant was then wrongfully placed on administrative leave, without pay, and 
remained on that inappropriate status until December 27, 1999, when the Sheriff 
terminated Claimant, as she refused to resign her employment over the County's 
accounting and payroll errors. 
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As a consequence of the County's extortious attempts, their capricious 
and malicious action, ongoing threats and false statements against Claimant in 
an attempt to coerce her into surrendering her employment, Claimant became 
physically impaired, and required to seek medical attention with Dr. Stephen E. 
Spencer, who diagnosed her as having suffered acute depression and severe 
situational distress from the psychological injury and extreme trauma imposed 
upon her. 
From August 1999 through December 1999, Ada County, through R. 
Monte MacConnell, acting in behalf of the Sheriff, presented Claimant with 
numerous demands for informal meetings to occur, notwithstanding the fact 
said Killeen and MacConnell knew Claimant was then under a physician's care, 
on medication, and forbidden to participate in any confrontational meetings due 
to her psychological trauma and needed medical treatment, until further notice 
On October 5, 1999, after Claimant had been threatened with malicious 
prosecution, and wrongfully placed on Administrative Leave Without Pay, the 
Sheriff still regarded her to be a "full status" employee, and "ordered" Claimant 
to report to the County Jail Facility, at 1:00 p.m., to be diagnosed by the County 
Physician, Dr. Charles Steuart. Claimant did as ordered, and in the company of 
her husband, did go to the Jail Facility and as "ordered", did meet Dr. Steuart as 
required, and was then paraded past employees in the facility, and compelled 
to undergo a diagnosis by Dr. Steuart to determine her mental and physical 
state; that Dr. Steuart confirmed the state of trauma as diagnosed by Dr 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR ENTRY OF DECLARATORY RULING ON THE 
APPLICATION, CONSTRUCTION AND VALIDITY OF IDAHO'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 
LAW, AS REFLECTED BY THE ORDERS ENTERED BY REFEREE ON MARCH 25,2005, APRIL 
12,2005, MAY 10,2005, MAY 12,2005 AND JUNE 3,2005 P. 9 
Spencer, and informed the County she could not then participate in any such 
confrontational settings. 
On December 14, 1999, Sheriff Killeen again was informed Claimant still 
remained under the care and supervision of her physician, Dr. Spencer; that her 
condition was worsening, and the County would not be allowed to engage her in 
any confrontational settings, and Claimant submitted physician verification of 
the nature and extent of her injuries in her continuing compliance with Ada 
County Code, Cj 1-71-IF. 
It was later confirmed by the events on December 16'~ and 17'~, 1999, 
Claimant had been under surveillance (stalked) by Sheriff detective(s), and 
specifically such surveillance was linked solely to these administrative overpayment 
errors. 
Without accommodating Claimant in any manner, in light of the medical 
advice and opinion being provided to her by Dr. Spencer, on December 27, 1999, 
Sheriff Killeen chose to terminate Claimant, effective immediately and without 
showing any good cause for termination, required by Federal and State law and 
Ada County Code. 
During this entire time Claimant was employed with the Ada County Sheriffs 
Office, she was always regarded as an exemplary employee; had never received 
an unsatisfactory rating, and was deemed to be an excellent asset to the Sheriffs 
Office. A copy of Claimants February 16, 1999 and March 17, 1999 performance 
evaluations are attached as Exhibit 1 and 2 
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Due to the severity of Claimant's psychological workplace injury and its 
continuing and worsening state, caused from the misconduct of the Sheriff and his 
agents, Claimant sought the medical advice and opinion of Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend, 
M.D. on October 16, 2002. Dr. Heyrend advised Claimant she was suffering a 
severe mental-physical injury, and referred to it as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. 
In February 2003, these Defendants, refusing to compensate Claimant, 
chose to initiate the process to have Claimant evaluated by Dr. Cynthia 
Brownsmith, who has labeled herself to be a "forensic" psychologist. During 
February and March 2003, and instead of contacting Claimant's counsel to 
schedule Claimant for an evaluation by Dr. Brownsmith, Defendants' counsel, Jon 
Bauman, called Claimant's place of employment on three (3) occasions and 
specifically requested to speak directly with Claimant. 
Claimant informed Dr. Heyrend of Defendants' attempt to have Claimant 
evaluated by Dr. Brownsmith, and on April 21, 2003, Dr. Heyrend notified 
Claimant's counsel of his concern over the structure of Dr. Brownsmith's intended 
evaluation when he stated (the evaluation) "could smack of re-victimization". See 
Exhibit 3. 
Based upon this medical opinion provided by Dr. Heyrend, and concern Dr. 
Brownsmith was a psychologist, not a surgeon or physician, as defined by § 72-102 
(24), Claimant expressed her objection to such an evaluation. On June 18, 2003, 
Industrial Commission Referee, Douglas A. Donohue, entered a Notice of Intent to 
Rule and Order, granting Defendants Motion to Compel Claimant's attendance and 
cooperation at the evaluation scheduled to commence with Dr. Brownsmith on June 
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20, 2003. On June 19, 2003, Claimant submitted a response to the Commission's 
Notice, providing concerns and argument, and on June 19, 2003, the Commission 
issued an order consistent with its June 18'~ Notice and Order, requiring Claimant 
to appear and cooperate with Dr. Brownsmith. 
On June 20, 2003, and with heightened emotional trepidation, Claimant did 
appear for this appointment with Dr. Brownsmith, and then presented herself for 
follow-up appointments on June 24, 2003 and July 11, 2003. On August 29, 2003, 
Dr. Brownsmith's report and evaluation was received, found to contain substantial 
misstatements, errors, and fabrications which clearly distorted the facts and events 
surrounding Claimant's involvement, her termination, and the use on non- 
behavioral words and phrases in her attempt to deflect fault away from Ada County, 
and to focus the underlying cause of the County's payroll errors directly on and 
back to Claimant. 
On October 29, 2003, Claimant's counsel sent Dr. Brownsmith very detailed 
correspondence (19 pages) summarizing the complete history of events that 
caused Ms. Gibson to incur the psychological workplace injury, and requested Dr. 
Brownsmith correct the contents and implications in her evaluation and report. 
Attached to that letter was a forty-two (42) page Addendum, describing in specific 
detail her errors, fabrications and misstatements which were created solely by Dr. 
Brownsmith. As of this date, Dr. Brownsmith has not responded to this request to 
correct her report to insure the Record in this dispute reflects what she believes to 
be an accurate, factual and fair assessment presented by her. See Exhibits 4 and 
5. 
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On March 4, 2005, Defendants' counsel contacted Claimant's counsel as a 
further effort to have "Stacy Gibson meet with Dr. Brownsmith for an update of her 
original interview", and said "Dr. Brownsmith needs to interview Mr. Gibson, Stacy's 
husband, as weli" (Exhibit 6), and on March 14, 2005, Defendants' counsel 
requested the Commission Referee schedule a telephone hearing, seeking a 
determination of how to proceed with a follow-up interview of Claimant and 
husband by Dr. Brownsmith. See Exhibit 7. 
On March 25, 2005, Commission Referee, Douglas A. Donohue, entered an 
order stating "Claimant shall attend the evaluation with Dr. Brownsmith as 
scheduled at Dr. Brownsmith's availability". Emphasis added. Exhibit 8. 
On April 6, 2005, Defendants' counsel, unilaterally and without 
accommodating Claimant and her primary care psychiatrist, Dr. Heyrend, chose to 
schedule Claimant for a further evaluation with Dr. Brownsmith on April 14, 2005 
(Exhibit 9), and on April 8, 2005, Claimant's counsel responded to Defendants, to 
acknowledge Claimant would present herself for a follow-up evaluation by Dr. 
Brownsmith, and provided Defendants with dates which would be accommodating 
to both Claimant and Dr. Heyrend. See Exhibit 10. 
On April 12, 2005, the Commission Referee, after telephone conference on 
April 11, 2005, entered an order which stated "that the availability of any other 
physician was not a basis for schedulinq", thus abrogating Idaho law and nullifying 
Claimant's right to have her primary care physician in attendance at the evaluation. 
On April 14, 2005, Claimant and her husband, under protest, complied with 
the Referee's March 25, 2005 order, and did present themselves for the follow-up 
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evaluation conducted by Dr. Brownsmith. After being questioned for over two (2) 
hours during Dr. Brownsmith's evaluation on April 14, 2005, Claimant became 
extremely disconcerted, angry, crying and explosive, and was clearly victimized, as 
confirmed on the video taken by Defendants; ,Claimant suffered at that moment a 
severe panic attack, as Dr. Brownsmith continued to ignore Claimant's concerns 
over the multitude of inaccuracies, fabrications and misstatements in Dr. 
Brownsmith's August 27, 2003 report, created from earlier stressful evaluations, 
and Claimant's efforts to discuss the glaring errors and need for honesty and 
correction was being brushed off and ignored. See video tape, Exhibit 11. 
Because Dr. Brownsmith does not deal with disorders of the mind and brain, 
like a psychiatrist is doing in the treatment and chosen course of therapy, Dr. 
Brownsmith was viewed as lacking the appropriate training and education to 
comprehend, diagnose or evaluate Claimant's Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD), and as clearly demonstrated, Dr. Brownsmith could not manage the stress, 
and could not assist Claimant with any means of medical treatment to calm 
Claimant's reactionary outburst, and Claimant was simply left to leave Dr. 
Brownsmith's office, in her state of heightened outrage and helplessness. 
Claimant's husband was required to attend to Claimant's immediate medical need, 
as she was hyperventilating, shaking and crying uncontrollably, experiencing 
dizziness, blurred vision, and in need of immediate medical attention; Claimant 
could not return to work on April 14, 2005, and medical treatment was sought from 
Dr. Heyrend as soon as his scheduled permitted, which occurred April 15, 2005. 
See Exhibit 12. -
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This April 141h session came as a result of the Referee's March 25, 2005 and 
April 12, 2005 orders, directing Claimant to attend the further evaluation with Dr. 
Cynthia Brownsmith, scheduled solely at Dr. Brownsmith's choosinq, with no 
consideration or accommodation given to Claimant and her primary care doctor's 
schedule for available participation. 
Approximately two (2) weeks before, on March 31, 2005, Dr. Heyrend did 
conduct an electroencephalogram (EEG) brain mapping diagnostic testing process 
on Claimant to confirm the objective presence of Claimant's PTSD injury, and in an 
effort to demonstrate the need for Defendants to properly compensate Claimant, 
not re-victimize her, as required by ldaho Workmen's Compensation law, and not 
aggravate her further with unnecessary and confrontational evaluations and 
intrusive diagnoses. On April 6, 2005 Claimant's counsel notified Defendants' 
counsel Dr. Heyrend had conducted the EEG of Claimant's brain. Exhibit 13. 
On April 28, 2005, Jewel Owen, State Insurance Fund (SIF), without 
providing Claimant any accommodating effects required by ldaho law, and without 
inquiry, unilaterally scheduled Claimant to be evaluated on May 11, 2005, by Dr. 
Richard W. Wilson, M.D., a local neurologist and known SIF medical advocate 
(Exhibit 14). On May 6, 2005, Claimant submitted an Objection to these unilateral 
and unaccommodating efforts by Defendants to schedule further evaluations 
without needed accommodations 
On May 10, 2005, Claimant caused to be filed a Motion requesting the 
Commission to undertake to reconsider its order of May 10, 2005, as that order 
required Claimant to submit to an intrusive examination by Defendants' advocate, 
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Dr. Richard W. Wilson, M.D., who has now been brought into the medical 
assessment as Defendants' neurologist. In support of Claimant's Motion, an 
Affidavit was prepared by and presented from her primary care psychiatrist, Dr. F. 
LaMarr Heyrend, M.D., who verified his medical opinion Claimant is still suffering 
significantly from the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) caused by the 
County, and has been re-victimized by Dr. Cynthia ~rownsm.ith, Defendants' choice 
of a psychologist, during examination and re-examination efforts, as desired by 
Defendants. See Exhibit 15. 
On May 10, 2005, the Commission Referee compelled Claimant to attend 
and cooperate with the examination by Dr. Wilson as unilaterally scheduled by SIF, 
but the order was again unreasonably unaccommodating to Claimant and Dr. 
Heyrend.,as required by Idaho law 
Again, on May 12, 2005, the Commission Referee issued a further order, 
therein once again compelling Claimant to attend and cooperate with the 
examination by Dr. Wilson as was unilaterally scheduled by SIF, and again, the 
order was unreasonable and unaccommodating to Claimant. 
On June 3, 2005, the Commission Referee entered another order again 
compelling Claimant to attend and cooperate with an evaluation by Dr. Wilson, and 
"Such scheduling is at Dr. Wilson's availability only". 
These orders of May 'lo, 2005, May 12,2005 and June 3, 2005, entered by 
the Industrial commission Referee, ordered and compelled Claimant to attend and 
cooperate in an independent medical evaluation (IME) conducted by Dr. Richard 
W. Wilson, even though Claimant had clearly not stabilized from the previous 
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disruption in her recovery and treatment, and needed therapy and medication to 
contain her trauma. 
In that final order of June 3, 2003, Referee Donohue did order Claimant to 
reimburse Defendants for Dr. Wilson's assessment billed for an alleged "missed 
appointment". 
ARGUMENT AND CASE AUTHORITY 
Dr. Heyrend has classified Claimant's condition as a "mental-physical" 
workplace injury in accordance with his medical diagnosis and as defined by 
existing case law, and Dr. Heyrend has verified the extreme nature of Claimant's 
PTSD condition with electroencephalogram (EEG) diagnostic brain mapping and 
testing. Dr Heyrend's medical opinion remains absolute: Claimant suffers from a 
severe case of PTSD, caused by the County, and Claimant is being re-victimized 
each time she is confronted by advocates of the County and State Insurance Fund 
who have had an agenda to be very intrusive in their evaluation of Claimant with 
their paid advocacy professionals, who appear to seek to undermine the validity of 
Ms. Gibson's claim, and who have continued in a manner to unilaterally schedule 
Claimant for medical evaluations by advocates of Defendants, without 
accommodating Claimant and her physician in-any manner to safeguard her well 
being. Dr. Heyrend has confirmed the confrontational effects of the episodes 
conducted by the paid advocates on June 20,2003, June 24,2003, July I I, 2003, 
and lastly on April 14, 2005, which has resulted in repeated re-victimization, 
whether it had been intended as creating that result, or whether it was simply a 
resulting consequence thereof; the damaging effect was real and very injurious to 
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her treatment and physical health and well being; that Dr Heyrend was required to 
prescribe Guanabenz to Claimant on April 15, 2005, as a final effort to balance the 
locus caeruleus aspect of Claimant's brain, which, as confirmed with time in other 
cases, will serve to reduce the level of anxiety, and structure a pathway for the 
beneficial effect of ongoing psychotherapy sessions; that additional time was 
required for Dr. Heyrend to provide the medical treatment to sufficiently stabilize her 
health before a patient, such as Claimant, is capable of being confronted by further 
adversarial medical evaluators and examinations. Because of this trauma, any 
future adversarial proceedings must be conducted in the presence of Dr. Heyrend, 
who would intervene if he determined he was witnessing a maliciously intrusive and 
damaging process, to protect Claimant and his patient from this abusive self- 
serving conduct engaged in by the County. 
Dr. Heyrend is responsible for Claimant's treatment and therapy for 
recovery, and would be contradicting his medical opinion and advice given to her to 
allow these injuries to take place, as it prevents healing, and serves only to 
debilitate her. Dr. Heyrend is Claimant's primary care psychiatrist, and is 
vehemently opposed to these further confrontations by advocates of Ada County 
and the State Insurance Fund, especially when such intrusive procedures are of 
such a debilitating consequence. Dr. Heyrend is convinced should Claimant be 
subjected to any more intrusive and unwarranted examinations, there is a great and 
real risk of causing Claimant psychological trauma and increase the level of 
permanent psychological injury. 
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Pursuant to § 72-435, ldaho Code, the Industrial Commission may suspend 
proceedinqs when a Claimant participates in unreasonable and injurious practices 
(or conduct) that tend to imperil or retard medical recovery. The consequence of 
these intrusive and disruptive evaluation endeavors by such adversarial evaluations 
is causing that retardation, and the Commission cannot continue to condone 
conduct resulting in the disruption of what is intended to promote Claimant's 
recovery. To compel Claimant's participation in adversarial and confrontational 
examinations (IMEs) has thus far served to retard and defeat a treating 
psychiatrist's efforts at medical recovery, and this situation has simply degraded 
these evaluations into a proverbial conundrum, a Commission that appears to be 
condoning the interference in Claimant's efforts at medical recovery, and at the 
same time, requiring IMEs and giving Defendants their right of IME examination to 
enable them to develop a defense perception of the claim, but at the traumatic 
damage to Claimant's recovery At this time, for Claimant to participate in such 
examinations is not only unreasonable and perilous to her health, but exposing her 
to permanent damage, and does violate the advice and healing effects of her 
therapist, and does appear to contravene ldaho law. 
As provided in the Affidavit of Dr. F LaMarr Heyrend, M.D. (Exhibit 15), any 
such attempts by Ada County and the State Insurance Fund, through the 
instrumentality of the ldaho Industrial Commission, to compel Claimant to be further 
examined by advocates, will be injurious to her mental and physical health, and 
such a resulting consequence does not only violate the therapist's healing efforts, 
but also Dr. Heyrend's oath of practice to protect his patient. 
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The last three (3) attempts by Defendants for examination have not been 
accommodating to Claimant in any fashion, to her medical health and to Dr. 
Heyrend, and she was denied the intended purpose and controlling effects of ldaho 
law, as she was made to endure conduct that was injurious to her health and 
contrary to her medical recovery. In the letter dated April 6, 2005 (Exhibit 9), Mr. 
Jon Bauman unilaterally undertook to schedule Claimant for evaluation by Dr. 
Brownsmith, deliberately done without accommodating need for her psychiatrist's 
presence, and that prevented the treating therapist's attendance as is contemplated 
and absolutely allowed by § 72-433 (2), Idaho Code. In the Commission's order on 
March 25, 2005, the Referee stated Claimant is allowed to bring one (1) treating 
physician, but defeated that allowance by the April 12, 2005 order, stating the 
availability of any other physician was not a basis for scheduling. 
In a similar fashion, done unilaterally and without sufficient notice, 
Defendants scheduled a medical evaluation of Claimant by Dr. Richard W Wilson, 
their recently selected IME neurologist, scheduled to be conducted on May 11, 
2005, as first scheduled by Jewel Owen, State Insurance Fund, under demand 
letter to Claimant's counsel on April 28, 2005 (Exhibit 14). This request did not 
accommodate Claimant and Dr. Heyrend, and was intentionally designed to 
prevent any opportunity for reasonable notice for attendance of Claimant's primary 
care psychiatrist, contra-ary to 3 72-433 (2), ldaho Code. 
These unilateral schedulings are in contradiction of ldaho law, as Industrial 
Commission proceedings are intended to be simple, accommodatin~ to claimants, 
and above all, to seek justice. See Hartman v. Double L Manufacturing, Employer, 
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and Everest National lnsurance Company. Surety, ldaho Supreme Court, Docket 
No. 30372, filed April 6, 2005; Hagler v. Micron Technoloay, Inc., 118 ldaho 596, 
798 P.2d 55 (1990). See also Claimant's Objection filed May 6, 2005. 
Claimant has objected to being exposed to injury again, based on the 
medical treatment recovery and advice of her psychiatrist, and will not submit to 
examinations potentially injurious to her mental, emotional and physical health, and 
especially so without having the presence and assurance of her primary care 
psychiatrist during any such adversarial endeavors. 
Claimant has provided expert medical opinions of Claimant's medical 
condition through the Affidavit of Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend, M.D. (Exhibit 15) 
Defendants are protesting in a manner suggesting Claimant's condition is irrelevant 
and unimportant, proposing in a cavalier fashion her injuries are not even the result 
of a workplace event. Dr. Heyrend's medical opinion identifies the injury as 
compensable, and relevant to support Claimant's concerns over her medical 
inability to participate in any further adversarial and confrontational IME 
examinations, and especially so until such time Dr. Heyrend provides a further 
medical opinion Claimant is medically capable of attending more controversial 
evaluations conducted by advocated of Ada County and the State lnsurance Fund. 
If Claimant were to work.against the medical opinion and advice of her primary 
treating psychiatrist, she would be participating in unreasonable and injurious 
practices that will imperil and retard her medical recovery. See Gross v. 
Unumprovident Life lnsurance Company, 319 F.Supp.2d 1129 (C.D.Cal. 2004). 
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The aspect of clear and obvious rejection of the claim and bias in this case 
by Defendants has become sensationally real. Firstly, the May 11, 2005 Affidavit of 
Dr. Wilson has suggested Claimant may have a condition of epilepsy. He has 
never spoken to or seen her. There has never been any basis to suggest Claimant 
has any "complex partial epilepsy", as suggested in the Affidavit of Dr. Richard W. 
Wilson. Claimant has no family history of epilepsy; never has any physician 
(including Stephen E. Spencer, M.D., F. LaMarr Heyrend, M.D., and never has any 
psychologist (Dr. Cynthia Brownsmith or Dr. Joe A. Lipetzky) ever found any basis 
to allude to such a diagnosed condition. What Claimant continues to suffer from 
came from the events that occurred on July 20, 1999, and continued thereafter, as 
a psychological workplace injury characterized as a "mental-physical" injury. 
With Defendants' new adversarial advocate, and without even examining 
Claimant, we are given a premature medical opinion Claimant may have "complex 
partial epilepsy", because of the abnormal EEG results obtained by Dr. Heyrend 
when he conducted the brain mapping diagnostic assessment of Claimant. Even 
though an electroencephalogram is a useful tool and important potential to consider 
epilepsy, the EEG is specifically used to determine suspected brain tumors, 
infection, inflammation, bleeding, head injuries; or diseases in the brain and brain 
activity. Dr. Wilson's Affidavit lacks this awareness of information, and gives rise to 
a suspicion he may not be well equipped to address PTSD diagnosis, or a 
therapeutic treatment as best needed. EEG's are utilized for modeling (mapping) 
brain activity in patients suffering from conditions of Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder, Schizophrenia, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, alcoholism, the 
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neurophysiology of learning disabilities, and explosive behavior in adolescents. Dr. 
Heyrend, within his psychiatric practice, has made an extensive analysis of these 
conditions, having conducted and analyzed over 10,000 EEGs. With all due 
respect, an EEG, by itself, cannot confirm the existence of epilepsy or a seizure 
disorder. In epilepsy people, the EEG may appear completely normal between 
seizures. EEG neurotherapy and neurofeedback has become a well-established 
and accepted method for testing and treating PTSD military veterans. 
Consequently, Dr. Wilson is being viewed as not only confrontational, but also 
controversial. 
On May 18'~, the State Insurance Fund (Jewel Owen) sent Claimant's 
counsel another notice (Exhibit 16) advising Claimant they again scheduled 
Claimant to be seen by Dr. Richard W. Wilson on May 26, 2005, but prior to that, on 
May 20, 2005, Defendants' counsel sent Claimant's counsel a letter, requesting 
payment of $1,266.00 because Claimant did not show for an IME with Dr. Wilson 
on May 1 I, 2005 (Exhibit 17). in the commentary, Dr. Wilson's billing statement 
chose to opine "patient's condition is not related to emplovment", yet he never saw 
her. It must be appreciated, Dr. Wilson has never spoken to Claimant, and 
therefore, one must ask how and from whom has such an opinion been perceived. 
In part of the June '3, 2005 order, Referee Donohue required Claimant to 
reimburse Defendants for charges of Dr. Wilson, for what Referee Donohue has 
characterized as a "missed appointment", when in fact, Defendants and the 
Referee were fully advised prior to the appointment Claimant's attendance at any 
such controversial and adversarial medical evaluation was contrary to and 
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working against the medical advice given by her primary care physician, and 
would cause Claimant further psychological and physical harm and injury, 
especially if not treated and stabilized. Unfortunately, after being fully advised of 
the genuine threat against Claimant's health, the Referee entered his orders on 
May 10, 2005 and May 12, 2005, which ordered Claimant to attend and 
cooperate with the examination of Dr. Wilson, contrary to the medical opinion and 
advice of Claimant's primary care psychiatrist. 
Claimant is under no obligation to reimburse Defendants for the 
appointment, in light of the fact the appointment was unilaterally scheduled by 
Defendants, without accommodating Claimant and Dr. Heyrend in any manner. 
If Claimant had chosen to comply with the Referee's order(s), she would have 
done so against the medical advice and opinion of her primary care physician, 
Dr. Heyrend, and does not want to experience more psychological and physical 
injury. 
Defendants have shown no desire to seek or administer justice in this case; 
rather they seek to defeat the claim and deny benefits. It appears the sole purpose 
(and the consequence) of these tactics is to expose Claimant to ongoing emotional 
and mental stress, and cause her greater emotional disturbances to encourage a 
settlement. As addressed above in the "Statement of Facts", the Ada County 
Sheriff and his agents conducted themselves in a similar manner after Dr. Spencer 
opined his medical advice and opinion to Claimant that she was not to attend any 
adversarial and confrontational informal meetings until she could become medically 
stable. 
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These repeated attempts to engage a confrontatronal adversarial mental~ty 
IS similar to the former attempts for direct contact wlth Claimant, by Defense 
counsel, in the months of February and March 2003, and now with repeated 
attempts, unilaterally conducted, without accommodating Claimant, in their effort to 
force Claimant's attendance with a medical advocate, putting Claimant in another 
adversarial and confrontational setting. Such conduct has the effect of causing 
Claimant emotional stress and psychological harm, when Mr. Bauman asked to 
speak directly with Claimant at her place of employment, instead of attempting to 
schedule matters with Claimant's counsel. We can tolerate these disturbing 
strategies to some degree as undertaken by Defendants, as we seek to engage a 
course of fundamental good faith resolut~on, but this composite of conduct has 
culminated in overloading Claimant's ability to deal with these ongoing adversarial 
and deliberately confrontational acts, and efforts must be taken to prevent any more 
injury, as such has become the medical advice to Claimant. 
CONCLUSION 
Claimant respectfully requests this Industrial Commission to enter a 
declaratory ruling allowing her to remain compliant with the medical advice of her 
primary care psychiatrist, and allowing her physician to continue his efforts to 
stabilize Claimant's medical condition over such time as needed before being 
again "ordered" by the Commission (or Referee) to attend any further adversarial 
and intrusive evaluations by any further medical advocates of Defendants. 
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Claimant does request this Industrial Commission to enter an order 
granting all relief Claimant requested in the Petition for Declaratory Ruling, based 
upon the facts, concerns and case authorities set fo 
Dated this =ay of June 2005. 
Attorney for Claimant, and 
Party of Interest 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the - \ c a y  of June 2005, 1 caused a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following 
persons at the following addresses as follows: 
Mr. Jon Bauman 
Elam & Burke 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1 539 
Vernon K. Smith 
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